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A UNIFIED THEORY OF JUSTICE:
THE INTEGRATION OF FAIRNESS INTO EFFICIENCY
Michael I. Swygert*
Katherine Earle Yanes* *
Abstract: An idea generally shared by both economists and philosophers is that a legal
rule may either achieve distributive fairness or bring about an efficient outcome, but not both.
In this Article, the authors argue that justice requires that legal rules consider both fairness
and efficiency. The Article discusses the Coase Theorem, as a tool for determining the most
efficient allocation of rights and duties, and the ideas of John Rawls for deriving a fair social
contract. The authors then combine aspects of these two hypothetical consensus models into a
unified theory of justice that considers the question of what agreements parties would enter
into if they could bargain costlessly ex ante without knowledge of which side of the bargain
they would ultimately obtain. The answers to this question, the authors contend, will form the
basis for legal rules that give weight not only to fairness, but also to efficiency, and thereby
will achieve just results.
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A Unified Theory of Justice
I.

INTRODUCTION

Is justice found in efficiency or in fairness? This is a fundamental
question of contemporary jurisprudence.' Both the view of justice as
fairness (having historical roots in natural-law theories) and the
perception of justice as efficiency (with roots in legal positivism,
especially utilitarian theories) assume that law and social policy are
instrumental and that consequences matter.2 Beyond that mutual
assumption, fairness and efficiency discourses often diverge into separate

worlds. But they need not. In this Article we merge these discourses into
a unified theory of justice in which a concept of fairness as empathy is
integrated into an efficiency construct that acknowledges and responds to
influences of social norms.
A.

The Dilemma ofPostmodernism

In this postmodern era, diverse claims regarding normative bases for
law and justice have earned respectability in scholarly works.3
1. See, e.g., Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to
Post-Modernism 60 (1997) ("The concept of efficiency as justice is what many of the critics of the
Chicago approach to law and economics find so troubling."); iU at 80 ("[Others] argue that legaleconomic policy should [have a] concern for both allocative and distributionalimpacts, as well as a
continuing concern forjusticeandfairness.") (citation omitted). Mercuro and Medema write:
[An] issue is whether efficiency should play any role at all in the determination of what
constitutes justice. This has become the arena of one of the most widespread arguments
regarding the Law and Economics movement. whereas Posner, for example, has argued
eloquently that efficiency is moral and comports with the dictates of justice, others are equally
adamant in their views that the use of the efficiency criterion in making law is antithetical to the
idea that law should reflect some sense ofjustice.
Id. at 186; see also James Boyd White, Economics and Lv: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 Tenn.
L. Rev. 161, 198 (1987) (arguing that language of economics needs to be "integrated with ... the
rest of our culture").
2. Law is "instrumental" in that it is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Ronald
Dworkin argues that the consequences of legal decisions are critical to legal theory, that law is a
social phenomenon wherein "it matters... how judges decide cases." Ronald Dworkin, Law's
Empire 3 (1986). Competing jurisprudential theories share a common characteristic of attempting to
explain how the law can work for just ends. Id. at 408-09.
3. Postmodem jurisprudence refers to the legal literature of the latter decades of the twentieth
century that has departed from the century's mainstream perspectives-those predominately rational,
positivistic, and natural law traditions that assert foundational truths, neutral principles, and
transcendental values. These perspectives have been replaced, it is claimed, by "a more pluralistic,
contextual, and nonessential explanation of law and legal decisionmaking developed for a
multicultural society." Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at
Century's End 2 (1995). Minda discusses five postmodem legal movements: law and economics,
critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, law and literature, and critical race theory. Id. at 83-185.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 73:249, 1998

Postmodem theories, including law and economics, 4 critical legal
studies,' law and literature,6 critical race theory,7 feminist jurisprudence,
In addition to presenting an overview of these five postmodern jurisprudential movements, his book
includes a brief discussion of construction theory as relating to social norms and meanings. Id. at
120-21.
One of the characteristics of postmodemism is that its theorists distrust "all attempts to create
large-scale, totalising theories in order to explain social phenomena." Costas Douzinas et al.,
PostmodernJurisprudence:The Law of the Text in the Texts ofLaw at x (1991).
For other discussions of postmodern legal theory, see John Lukas, The End of the Twentieth
Century and the End of the Modern Age (1993), Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process
Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 601 (1993), Nancey Murphy & James
Wm. McClendon, Jr., DistinguishingModem and Postmodern Theologies, 5 Mod. Theology 191
(1989), Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/FeminismILaw,77 Cornell L. Rev. 254 (1992), and Peter
C. Schanck, UnderstandingPostmodern Thought and Its Implicationsfor Statutory Interpretation,
65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2505 (1992).
4. The law and economics movement has had many central theorists over the last three-and-a-half
decades. For a few of the most important, see Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values
(2d ed., Yale U. Press 1976) (1951), David W. Barnes & Lynn A. Stout, Cases and Materialson
Law and Economics (1992), Gary S. Becker, The EconomicApproach to Human Behavior (1976),
Guido Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970), R.H. Coase, The
Firm, the Market, and the Law (1988) [hereinafter Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law],
Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (2d ed. 1997), Anthony T. Kronman &
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Contract Law (1979), Robin Paul Malloy, Law and
Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice(1990), Mereuro & Medema, supra
note 1, A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (1983), Richard A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Posner, Economic Analysis of Law], Richard
A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (1981) [hereinafter Posner, Economics of Justice], Steven
Shavell, Economic Analysis ofAccident Law (1987), Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic
Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 385 (1993) [hereinafter Becker, Nobel Lecture],
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961),
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost],
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways ofCriticizingthe Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802 (1982), Charles J. Goetz
& Robert E. Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981), Edmund W.
Kitch, The Intellectual FoundationsofLaw and Economics, 33 J. Legal Educ. 184 (1983), Lewis A.
Komhauser, The GreatImage ofAuthority, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 349 (1984), and Susan Rose-Ackerman,
ProgressiveLaw and Economics-And the New AdministrativeLaw, 98 Yale L.J. 341 (1988).
5. For an excellent discussion of critical legal studies evolution, see Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal
Studies: A Political History, 100 Yale L.J. 1515 (1991). Well-known critical legal studies
publications include: Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: 1780-1860 (1977);
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the
System (1983); Roberto Mangabelra Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1983);
J.M., Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 743 (1987); J.M., Transcendental
Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1131 (1994); Clare Dalton, An Essay on
the Deconstructionof ContractDoctrine, 94 Yale L.J. 997 (1985); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276 (1984); Peter Gabel & Joy M. Feinman,
Contract Law as Ideology, in The Politics ofLaw: A Progressive Critique 172 (David Kairys ed.,
1982) [hereinafter The Politics of Law]; Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology ofRights-Consciousness
and the Pact ofthe Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing,36
Stan. L. Rev. 293 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
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and, more recently, construction theories involving social norms and
meanings,9 have gained increasing acceptance. Such theories are
89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
Buff. L. Rev. 205 (1979); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1151
(1985).
For overviews of the critical legal studies movement, see Andrew Altman, CriticalLegal Studies:
A Liberal Critique (1990), and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987). For a
bibliography of critical legal scholarship through 1983, see Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare,
A Bibliography ofCriticalLegal Studies, 94 Yale L.J 461 (1984).
6. The publication in 1973 of University of Michigan Professor James White's The Legal
Imagination, it is claimed, was the beginning of the postmodern law and literature movement. See
Minda, supra note 3, at 149. White's project has been described as an attempt to demonstrate that the
study of literature involved interpretative processes similar to ones used in the law. Id.; see also
James Boyd White, Justice as Translation:An Essay in Culturaland Legal Criticism (1990); James
B. White, The Legal Imagination:Studies in the Nature ofLegal Thought andExpression (1973).
Other major contributions to the law and literature movement include: Richard H. Weisberg, The
Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modem Fiction (1984); Richard Weisberg,
Poethics and Other StrategiesofLaw and Literature(1992); Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law
Narrative?,45 Buff. L. Rev. 141 (1997); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,45 Stan. L. Rev. 807 (1993); Stanley Fish, Working on the
Chain Gang: Interpretationin Law and Literature,60 Tex. L. Rev. 551 (1982); Sanford Levinson,
Law as Literature,60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982); and Ian Ward, Law and Literature,4 Law & Critique
43 (1993).
7. For a bibliography of critical race scholarship through 1992, see Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, CriticalRace Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 Va. L. Rev. 461 (1993). See also
Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical
Race Scholarship, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1864 (1990); Kimberd6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformationand Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331
(1988); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1991 Duke L.J. 39; Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression,98 Yale L.J. 1559
(1989).
8. The feminist literature is voluminous and often at odds within its paradigms. Among the wellknown works are: Mary Joe Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism (1992); Carol Gilligan, In a Different
Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and
Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Searchfor Gender Justice, 96 Yale L.J. 914 (1987); Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,8 Signs
635 (1983); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court. 1986 Term-Forward: Justice Engendered, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1987); Susan Moller Okin, Sexual Difference, Feminism, and the Law, 16 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 553 (1991); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1699 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 Yale L.J. 1731 (1991); Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence,56 Ind. L.J
375 (1981); Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Joan C. Williams,
DeconstructingGender,87 Mich. L. Rev. 797 (1989); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women
in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1559 (1991).
9. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, Three Theories ofSubstantive Fairness,19 Hofstra L. Rev. 33 (1990);
Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. &
Econ. 73 (1982) [hereinafter Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem]; Elizabeth Hoffman &
Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness:An ExperimentalExamination ofSubjects'
Concepts ofDistributive Justice, 14 J. Legal Stud. 259 (1985) [hereinafter Hoffraan & Spitzer, An
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acquiring the recognition formerly reserved for traditional theories of
legal positivism and natural law (including neutral principles) espoused
by earlier legal theorists."
Despite the growing acceptance of postmodern analysis, no cohesive
postmodernist perspective consensus has been forthcoming. For
example, Richard Posner suggests that a law and economics analysis
allows decisionmakers to promote justice by deciding disputes with the
object of the greater social good through wealth-maximizing

resolutions." In contrast, critical legal studies theorists (advancing a
widely-varied set of propositions) deny that justice results from any

analytic or economic model.' Some theorists have argued that claims of
legal rights are merely political demands, declared by the powerful for
the protection and preservation of their preferences. 3 Constructionists,
Experimental Examination]; Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L.J. 1 (1992);
Frank I. Michelman, Norms andNormativity in the Economic Theory ofLaw, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1015
(1978); Cass R. Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming), available in
Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics No. 46 (visited Feb. 7, 1998), <http://www.law.
uchicago.edu/PublicationsWorkinglindex.html>; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 903 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms].
10. Harold J. Berman has written that "[c]ontemporary American jurisprudence is in great need of
its own historical roots in the jurisprudence of the past" Letter from Harold J. Berman, Woodruff
Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, to Michael I. Swygert, Professor of Law,
Stetson College of Law (July 25, 1997) (on file with Washington Linv Review). Berman perceives
the conflict between justice as efficiency and justice as fairness as the contemporary battle between a
political view of law (efficiency) and a moral theory (fairness). Id.
11. "A second meaning ofjustice, perhaps the most common, is-efficiency." Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law, supra note 4, at 27. Posner adds that "there is more to notions of justice than a
concern for efficiency." Id. In his 1981 book, The Economics ofJustice, he wrote: "I have tried to
develop a moral theory that... holds that the criterion for judging whether acts and institutions are
just or good is whether they maximize the wealth of society." Posner, Economics ofJustice, supra
note 4, at 115. We read Posner's 1992 statements as "backing down" a little from his earlier strong
efficiency-as-justice thesis of 198 1.
12. James Boyd White, for example, has asserted that a person's motives and values are not
exogenous to justice as presumed under a claimed normative theory of law and economics. James
Boyd White, Law asRhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts ofCulturaland CommunalLife, 52 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 684, 698 (1985); see also Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of
Consent in the Moral and Political Visions ofFranz Kaka and RichardPosner,99 Harv. L. Rev.
384 (1985). For a survey of the variety of propositions advanced by critical legal studies scholars,
see Minda, supranote 3, at 106-27.
13. One commentator describing critical legal studies has written that the law "cannot be more
than a smokescreen concealing the efforts of the stronger to prey on the weaker." James Gordley,
The PhilosophicalOrigins of Modern Contract Doctrine231 (1991); see also Amitai Etzioni, The
Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the CommunitarianAgenda (1993); Mary Ann
Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of PoliticalDiscourse (1991); Christina Hoff Sommers,
Who Stole Feminism? How Women HaveBetrayed Women (1994); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology
ofRights-Consciousnessand the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984); Mark
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for their part, assert that the core law and economics assumption of
rational self-maximizing does not reflect the empirically discoverable
behavior in actual markets, and that peoples' choices are influenced at

least in part by conscious adherence to or rejection of perceived social
norms.' 4 Postmodenists within the critical race and feminist movements

attack notions of equality of individual rights, arguing that membership in racial or gender groups confers rights that at times trump the
rights of individuals who are not within the group-the politics of

identity. 5 Increasingly, postmodern theorists, predominantly feminists,
are claiming that an ethic of care involving empathy needs to be more
integrated into the law and its processes. 6 Similarly, many law-andliterature proponents advocate that law students, lawyers, and judges
read works such as Kafka's The Trial"7 to become more empathetic to the
abused, poor, or otherwise powerless members of society. 8
On the surface, these rhetorical waves fall into seemingly
incompatible categories. 9 On one hand, law and economics proponents
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and
Their Critics,70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 727 (1995).
14. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice 140
(1987); Finley, supra note 8; Duncan Kennedy, A CulturalPluralistCasefor Affirmative Action in
LegalAcademia, 1990 Duke L.J. 705; Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques ofLegal Academia, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 1745 (1989); Mar J. Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting
Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1988); Mad J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987); Martha
Minow, Not Only for Mysel." Identity, Politics, and Lmv, 75 Or. L. Rev. 647 (1996); Gary Peller,
Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L.J. 758.
For arguments against affirmative action or group rights, see, for example, Stephen L. Carter,
Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (1991), Thomas Sowell, Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality?
(1984), and Shelby Steele, The Content of OurCharacter111-65 (1990).
16. See infra Part Ill.A.
17. Franz Kafka, The Trial(Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1956) (1937).
18. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 527 (1982); Linda R.
Hirshman, Bronto, Bloom, and Bork- An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 177 (1988); Richard H. Weisberg, Three Lessons from Law and Literature, 27 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 285 (1993).
19. "Judge Richard Posner claims that the application of economic analysis to legal issues may be
'the most important development in legal thought in the last quarter century,"' notes Jonathan IL
Macey, in The Pervasive Influence ofEconomicAnalysis on Legal Decisionmaking, 17 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 107 (1994) (quoting Posner, EconomicAnalysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at xix). In contrast,
see Susan Moller Okin's article, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 99 Ethics 229
(1989), discussing John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971). Okin writes that Rawls "has been the
inspiration, in one way or another, for much of contemporary moral and political theory .... [a
theory based] on empathy and concern for others." Okin, supra,at 246.
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argue that legal rules should be applied to produce the most efficient,
wealth-maximizing consequences, wholly apart from empathic considerations about the parties and their relative situations.2" On the other hand,
many within the critical race, feminist, law and literature, and critical
legal studies movements claim that the efficiency norm is uncaring-that

law is just only when it is fair, and that it is fair only when it is made and
administered with empathy, that is, with a redistributive impact
benefiting the economically and politically weaker members of society. 1
Reviewing the periphery of diverse notions advanced by postmodernists
shows that each theorist asserts the superiority of his or her particular
conceptual discourse. 2 Scholars on both sides find no middle ground.
Efficiency and empathy, or efficiency and equity, are presumed to be

irreconcilable.'
But are these normative goals incompatible? Is the economically

efficient, wealth-maximizing world completely different from the world
20. As Richard Posner has noted, "The most aggressive version [of law and economics] argues
that economics not only explains the rules and institutions of the legal system but also provides the
ethically soundest guide to improving the system." Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4,
at 25 (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., Gilligan, supra note 8; Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics &
Moral Education (1984); Gertrude Nunner-Winkler, Two Moralities? A CriticalDiscussion of an
Ethic of Careand Responsibility Versus an Ethic ofRights andJustice, in Morality, MoralBehavior,
and Moral Development 348 (William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz eds., 1984); Okin, supra
note 19, at 229-49.
22. "[T]he difference between various [postmodem] writers and thinkers is... the extent to which
they take critical cognizance of the predicaments and paradoxes of their current intellectual
situation." Minda, supranote 3, at 4.
23. "[T]he exercise of empathetic imagination lacks normative significance." Richard A. Posner,
Overcoming Law 381 (1995). The incompatibility of justice as a caring or empathetic perspective
and as a rights-oriented construct is said to be "an ancient theme." Judith Areen, A Needfor Caring,
86 Mich. L. Rev. 1067, 1076-77 (1988). Ronald Dworkin has pointed out that contrasting
jurisprudential arguments have real meaning: "Any practical legal argument, no matter how detailed
and limited, assumes the kind of abstract foundation jurisprudence offers, and when rival
foundations compete, a legal argument assumes one and rejects others." Dworkin, supra note 2, at
90.
The battles between various views of legal formalism versus views of legal realism are the central
theme of Posner's The ProblemsofJurisprudence.Posner writes that the masculine extreme outlook
of law is legal positivism, while natural law reflects an extreme perspective of feminist
jurisprudence. Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 404-05 (1990). He notes,
however, that the "ethic of care" realm is "not a female preserve," but that many of the influential
male voices in the law have typified the ethic of care perspective, including Benjamin Cardozo and
Justice William Brennan. Id. at 407. He might have added William 0. Douglas and Earl Warren.
James Gordley has attacked the polarities of fairness and efficiency, asserting that "any viable
theory of contract will have to take the fairness of a contract into account," while acknowledging that
"there is no agreement [yet] as to how to do so." Gordley, supranote 13, at 230.

A Unified Theory of Justice
of fairness and empathy? And if the theoretical world, from which we
derive principles of efficiency and wealth maximization, cannot be
reconciled with the theoretical world in which notions of empathy and

fairness are taken into account, then on what theoretical basis can we
solve legal problems? For the law does not operate in a theoretical world.
It operates in the real world, where legal problem-solving must take into
account considerations of both fairness and efficiency.24
The objective of this Article is to explain how the law and economics
focus on efficiency and wealth maximization as normative measures of
good law and the claim of certain postmodernists that empathic care is a
normative principle of justice can be integrated into a single theory, one
that embraces the requirements of efficiency but is qualified by

constructive empathy. Such reconciliation is possible because justice as
empathy and justice as efficiency both theoretically result from a
consensus.' Although each model has its own conditions for bargaining,
these rules can be selectively combined into a single model.

24. A commentator noted:
[O]ur legal system should continue to reflect a complex mixture of not only our aspirations for
an efficient economic system, but also our moral and political values. The life of the law should
continue to be informed not only by economic logic, but social experience-even if it is
complex experience.
Eric w. Orts, Simple Rules and the Perils of Reductionist Legal Thought, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1441,
1479 (1995) (reviewing Richard A. Epstein's Simple Rules for a Complex World (1995)); see also
M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity The EmergingScience at the Edge of Orderand Chaos 38 (1992)
("[Y]ou have to look at the world as it is, not as some elegant theory says it ought to be.") (quoting
Stanford University Economics Professor Victor Norman).
An elegant expression of the "one-world view" has been provided by Michael J. Trebilcock in The
Limits ofFreedom ofContract(1993):
Both as individuals and as a community, we do not operate within a one-value view of the
world.... For economists to claim that they are interested only in maximizing the total value of
social resources, without being concerned about how gains in the value of social resources are to
be distributed.., or while ignoring the impact of economic change on the lives of individuals or
on the integrity or viability of long-standing communities, reflects a highly impoverished view
of the world. Alternatively, theorists committed only to concepts of distributive justice, who
proceed in their analysis by inviting us to assume a given stock of wealth, or a given increase in
the stock of wealth, and then asking what a just distribution of that wealth might entail, are
largely engaging in idle chatter as long as the wealth creation function is simply
assumed.... Similarly, communitarians who stress values of solidarity and interconnectedness
and discount values of individual autonomy and freedom risk pushing this perspective to an
extreme, where communitarian values become exclusionary, authoritarian, or repressive.
Id.
at 248 (citation omitted).
25. See discussion infra Parts II.A, III.D.
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Before demonstrating this integration, it will be necessary to outline
the basic tenets of each perspective. Part II of this Article reviews the
concept of justice as efficiency as derivable from a hypothetical private

consensus, focusing on the insights of University of Chicago economist
Ronald Coase.26 Part III turns to a discussion of the notion of justice as
fairness (empathy), achievable by way of consensus, relying in part on
the contractarian theory advanced by Harvard University philosopher

John Rawls. 27 Although Rawls never applied his thesis to allocations of
private rights and entitlements, two UCLA professors, Wesley Liebeler
(law) and Armen Alchian (economics), have done so by developing a
Hobbsean-Rawlsean ex ante contractarian rationale. 28 Part IV incorporates the ideas of Liebeler and Alchian in developing a consensus
model for resolving private law disputes. In building our model, we also
blend insights regarding law and empathy, especially those developed by
Lynne Henderson,29 to amplify and develop the thesis that empathy and
efficiency can be merged into a theoretical construct in which both ends
are achievable. Into this construct we also integrate elements of
constructive theory, relying on studies of simulated marketplace behavior
by Elizabeth Hoffnan and Matthew Spitzer," and the work of F.H.
Buckley demonstrating the influence in the marketplace of the "fairness
effect."'" Finally, we set out and discuss several examples illustrating
how our model could assist courts in resolving disputes.32

26. For a compilation of Coase's writings applicable to law and economics, see Coase, The Firm,
the Market, and the Law, supranote 4.
27. See John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism (1993) [hereinafter Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism]; Rawls,
supra note 19; John Rawls, The Priorityof Right and Ideas of Good, 17 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 251
(1988).
For a detailed analysis of Rawls's philosophical theories, see Thomas w. Pogge, Realizing Rawls
(1989); see also Peter F. Lake, Liberalism Within the Limits ofthe Reasonable Alone: Developments
ofJohn Ravls 's PoliticalPhilosophy, Its PoliticalPositivism, and the Limits on Its Applicability, 19
Vt. L. Rev. 603, 612 (1995) (noting that Rawls was intuitionist who acknowledged "that many moral
decisions rest on rational and reasonable arguments ... but that at some point(s), reference must be
made back to a plurality of principles with no basis in justification other than 'they seem most nearly
right').
28. See Wesley J. Liebeler & Armen Alchian, ConstitutionalBaselines by Virtual Contract:
A GeneralTheory and Its Application to Regulatory Takings, 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 153 (1994).
29. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574 (1987).
30. See, e.g., Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem, supra note 9; Hoffman & Spitzer, An
ExperimentalExamination,supra note 9.
31. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 9.
32. See infra Part IV.D.
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B.

Summary ofArgument

In his seminal article, The Problem of Social Cost, Coase formulated
the thesis that "if... market transactions are costless,. . . a
rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an
increase in the value of production."3' 3 Coase constructed an economic
model by which he demonstrated a phenomenon that many legal theorists
subsequently extolled as a prescriptive tool lawmakers (legislatures,
governmental agencies, and courts) could use to bring about the optimal
allocation of scarce resources and, by so doing, advance the greater
welfare. This model has become commonly known as the Coase
Theorem,34 explored in Part II of this Article.35 Coase's relevant
postulation can be restated generally as follows: if all parties to be
affected by a given situation could bargain costlessly, and if each
potentially-affected party could come to the table with complete
knowledge of all relevant factors, then the parties, in pursuing their
preferences, would reach an agreement that would allocate their
respective rights, obligations, and entitlements in a manner that would
maximize the situation's total output.36 Any agreement so reached would
be efficient and wealth-maximizing. 37 Most significant about this justiceas-efficiency claim, especially as others have advanced Coase's work, is
that any interference in the marketplace of legal relations should be made
to promote efficiency and wealth maximization by emulating the bargain
that would
have resulted had there been no impediments (transaction
3
costs). 1
In contrast to the justice-as-efficiency theme is the claim of justice as
fairness, considered in Part III of this Article.39 John Rawls confronted
the derivation of the principles of social justice in his 1971 book,
A Theory of Justice.4" Rawls emphasized the mechanism of a social
contract and thus extended the works of earlier social contract theorists,
33. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 4, at 15.
34. See infra Part H.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See infra Part II.B. The total output is the net increase in the total value of all the preferences
desired by the parties.
37. See infra Part I.B.
38. See Richard Craswell, ContractRemedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory ofEfficient Breach,
61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 630 (1988).
39. See infra Part Il.
40. Rawls, supra note 19.
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particularly Hobbes,4' Locke, 42 and Rousseau. 43 Rawls added a methodology for the derivation of the principles of justice that postulated
participants of a would-be society coming together in a hypothetical "veil
of ignorance," under which they would know nothing about their own
situations, but would otherwise be fully informed about human history,
conditions, nature, and proclivities. Then, together, these parties would
be able to agree on principles of governance, such agreement being
achievable not only through a combination of the members' intuitive and
rational mutual self-interests given what they knew, but especially on the
basis of what they did not know. Rawls called this hypothetical assembly
'
"the original position."45
The consensual model Rawls postulated in effect forces the
participants in the original position to have empathetic knowledge of
others since, as Susan Moller Okin has pointed out, any of the "others"
may be themselves.' Through such rational self-interest, one becomes, it
might be said, "constructively" empathetic of all others.47 The core
element in Rawls's model for deriving principles of justice is a mutually
self-directed and self-serving consensus. Unlike the Coasean model for
consensus, however, in Rawls's model, one's self-serving nature
produces a result shaped in part by rational risk avoidance or hedging.4"
This risk avoidance results from the rational use of constructive
49
empathy.
Although Rawls and Coase make different assumptions about those
who reach consensus, their assumptions regarding the process for
41. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Parts I and II (Bobbs-Merrill 1958) (1651) [hereinafter
Hobbes, Leviathan]; Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature, in The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic
(Ferdinand T6nnies ed., 2d ed. 1969) (1649). Many regard the latter as one of Hobbes's best works.
See, e.g., R.S. Peters, Thomas Hobbes, in 4 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 31 (Paul Edwards ed.,
1967).
42. See John Locke, An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding(Peter Nidditch ed., Clarendon
Press 1990) (1689); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1960) (1690) [hereinafter Locke, Two Treatises] (especially An Essay Concerning the True
Original,Extent, andEnd of Civil Government).
43. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract or Principles of PoliticalRight (Henry J.
Tozer trans., Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1895) (1762).
44. Rawls, supra note 19, at 136-42.
45. Id. at 17-22, 118; see also infra Part III.D.2.
46. Okin, supra note 19, at 243-49.
47. See discussion of "constructive empathy" infra Part IV.A.
48. See infra notes 301-06 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
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achieving consensus are similar. Whether deriving principles for forming
a just society or asking which party should be granted an entitlement, the
process is to reason what the parties themselves would have agreed to ex
ante if the obstacles to their bargaining had been removed."0
Rawls's consensus model is primarily a method for establishing
overriding public law principles, while the Coasean zero-transaction-cost
model has often been applied for the derivation of specific, private law.
The term "public law" in this Article refers to governmental
arrangements and constitutional provisions affecting the relations
individuals have with the State, including those relating to constitutional
and human rights. In contrast, "private law" signifies the powers,
privileges, immunities, duties, rights, liabilities, and entitlements that
define the juristic relations between and among individuals as derived
either through private contracts or through public laws, regulations, and
judicial decisions regulating or affecting those private relations. Given
these definitions, law and economics concepts have had greater influence
in the private law arena."' For example, a Coasean question for
determining how a court will or should rule in determining the rights and
obligations of the parties to a dispute is to ask what agreement the parties
would have reached had they been able to bargain their juristic relations
without transactional costs. Their bargain, Coase demonstrated, would be
optimally efficient regardless of any initial set of entitlements. 2
In many private relations, however, courts and other decisionmakers
have not allowed what would be the most efficient "Coasean" result. 3
Consider circumstances in which extreme disparities in bargaining power
exist and where markets are not competitive. Think of a low-level, nonunionized employee being hired by a large employer during periods of
high unemployment, an out-of-work tenant dealing with a landlord
during a housing shortage, or a low-income consumer buying goods on
credit from a low-income-neighborhood retailer, and note the
"interferences" with the parties' theoretical freedom to contract that
courts and legislatures have imposed. These include minimum wage (and
50. Each theorist assumes there would be zero transaction costs in his respective consensus
model, Coase expressly so, and Rawls by implication, because Rawls does not discuss the costs of
the parties' learning of their eligibility to participate in or the costs of gaining needed information to
operate in the original position.
51. See infra Part ll.C.
52. The concept of initial entitlements is explained infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of some of the suggestions theorists have made as to how lawmakers may
emulate the "Coasean" result, see infra Part II.C.
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maximum hour) laws, workplace safety standards, rent-ceiling laws, the
implied warranty of habitability, usury regulations, and legal doctrines
such as unconscionability, to list a few examples.
In these and similar situations, the agreement that the parties are
permitted to reach may be different from the agreement they would have
reached had they been given the theoretical opportunity to bargain
without transaction costs. This point becomes apparent upon examining
the "one-sided" agreements that parties with little bargaining power often
entered into prior to the restrictions or interferences of the law:
employees worked twelve hours per day, six days a week, around
dangerous machinery; low-income tenants lived in broken-down housing
without heat, water, or electricity; consumers bought products at usurious
rates of interest and with credit terms that upon default often resulted in
losing not only the item purchased, but everything previously purchased
from that seller.54
It is important to note that each of the above situations involved
contracts freely entered into, meaning that both parties to the contracts
believed themselves to be better off by entering into the bargain. In an
economic sense, the agreements were wealth-maximizing. Each contract
produced a net increase in marginal utility for each party, at least
prospectively.55 The reason these contracts strike us as "unfair" is not
because the parties were forced into them-they were not-but because
the disparity in bargaining power resulted in the stronger party receiving
almost all of the surplus utility created by the transaction,5 6 and because
of a social norm of perceived "fairness" that finds offensive the
disproportionate division of a transaction's surplus.57
If crafted under a theory of constructive empathy, some non-Coasean
laws and judicial interferences could ensure that a "fair" portion of the
surplus created by the transaction goes to and remains with the weaker
party. 5 Although requiring empathy for the weaker party may appear
inconsistent with Coasean analysis, this is not necessarily the case.

54. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964).
55. It often turns out that a contract, due to a variety of circumstances, becomes a "losing" one for
one or more of the parties, meaning that the expected marginal gain in utility does not occur.
56. By "surplus utility," in this Article, we refer to the total combined net increase in marginal
utility resulting from a transaction that is shared in whatever proportion by both parties to a
transaction.
57. See infra Part IV.B.
58. See infra Part IV.C.
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Coasean analysis helps determine which party would be granted a right
or an entitlement in a efficient bargain. The fairness analysis we integrate
here concerns the division of the surplus in the bargain that the Coase
Theorem tell us the parties would reach. We must be concerned with the
fairness of bargains, in part because the assumptions underlying the
Coase Theorem do not hold true in the real world. In a perfectly
competitive market, we would not need to be concerned with a bargain's
terms; they would be set by the market. Unfortunately, transactions costs
are never zero, and markets are not perfectly competitive. In the real
world, as Coase said, "for anything approaching perfect competition to
exist, an intricate system of rules and regulations would normally be
' Friederick Kessler
needed."59
pointed out over fifty years ago that parties
to contracts often do not and cannot bargain in the traditional sense of
making conscious trade-offs.6" Rather, the stronger party often dictates
the contract's terms, and the weaker party has the choice to "take it or
leave it" (and sometimes not even that choice).6 If the stronger party in a
59. 1RH. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in The Firm, the Market, and the Law, supra
note 4, at 9.
60. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943). According to Kessler, the phrase "contract of adhesion" was first used
by Patterson in his 1919 Harvard Law Review article, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy.
Kessler, supra, at 632 n.11; see also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1983). Rakoff lists seven characteristics of a contract of
adhesion:
(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that contains many terms
and clearly purports to be a contract.
(2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the transaction.
(3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type represented by the form
and enters into these transactions as a matter of routine.
(4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the representation that, except perhaps for
a few identified items (such as the price term), the drafting party will enter into the
transaction only on the terms contained in the document. This representation may be
explicit or may be implicit in the situation, but it is understood by the adherent.
(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to bargaining, the document is
signed by the adherent.
(6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented by the form-few,
at least, in comparison with the drafting party.
(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a whole is
the payment of money.
Id. at 1177 (citations omitted).
61. Kessler referred to "take it or leave it" in French as "t! prendre ou Li laisser." Kessler, supra
note 60, at 632; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 Harv.
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non-competitive market lacks empathy for the weaker party and is not,
through the interference of the law, constructively required to be

empathetic, a one-sided surplus of utility will result.
Although situations involving disparities in the bargaining power of
the parties are commonplace in society,62 when such disparities occur in
non-competitive markets, problems arise. In such circumstances, the

Coase Theorem provides neither predictability, in that it does not give us
the result that decisionmakers themselves reach in the real world, nor a
proper normative direction, in that it fails to suggest a result that
decisionmakers should reach. To be more "realistic," the Coase Theorem
needs to be modified by incorporating into it a component of faimess-a
component of rational constructive empathy.63
Rawls's assumption that the parties to a consensus have limited

knowledge about themselves under a "veil of ignorance" provides a
theoretical way to create constructive empathy. Although Rawls
primarily applied this restrictive knowledge assumption to the derivation
of principles for public law, this Article demonstrates that, by adding to
the Coase Theorem a condition of "hidden identity," 64 both efficiency
and fairness considerations can be integrated into the realm of private
law.
A Rawlsean type of limited-knowledge assumption may be integrated

into the Coase Theorem by changing the rules for entry into Coase's
model. The question becomes what agreement the parties would reach if
they were able to bargain costlessly and ex ante, assuming that they have
full knowledge of all of the costs, benefits, and alternatives available to
each of them, but that they do not know which party to the agreement

they will be. Any agreement that the parties would reach under these
L. Rev. 741 (1982). "[M]any contracts are made in markets that are highly imperfect." Id. at 750.
"[A] new paradigmatic principle-unconscionability-has emerged. This principle explains and
justifies the limits that should be placed upon the bargain principle on the basis of the quality of a
bargain." Id. at 799. Failing to place limits on the bargain principle, Eisenberg concluded, will
involve "greater costs to the system ofjustice" than placing such limits. Id. at 801.
62. For example, Professor Stewart Schwab has pointed out to us that when going to a chain
grocery outlet to purchase a box of cereal, the customer has no power to bargain individually with
the store owner over the price or contents of the box. Yet, a competitive larger market exists for
cereal, and the lack of the individual's effective bargaining power resulting in a "take it or leave it"
option does not render the sale an "unfair" bargain. Letter from Stewart J. Schwab, Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School, to Michael I. Swygert, Professor of Law, Stetson College of Law (June 25,
1997) (on file with Washington Law Review).
63. See infra Part IV.C.
64. The term "hidden identity" is explained infra Part IV.C.
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assumptions is one that will resolve the distortions caused by disparities
in bargaining power within non-competitive markets. Any consequent
agreement will be mutually accommodative in attempting to preserve
each party's original utility gain. In short, it will be based on a
hypothetical consensus involving a condition of hidden identity and a
principle of constructive empathy, together with the influence of the
social norms of risk aversion and perceived fairness.6"
This method, moreover, still preserves efficiencies attainable from the
Coasean hypothetical consensus model. In many, if not most, situations
where parties have roughly equal bargaining power or where the markets
are otherwise competitive, the results under this method will be
essentially the same as they would be without the condition of hidden
identity. To state this differently, when real bargaining is possible, in the
absence of extreme disparities in bargaining power, parties who do not
know their particular identities to a transaction will reach the same
agreement as parties who know which positions they are bargaining for.
On the other hand, an agreement resulting under a Coasean model so
modified would be different from the result reached under an efficiencyonly model in a non-competitive market where a gross disparity of
bargaining power existed between the parties. But, as will be
demonstrated in Part IV below, agreements made under the hybrid
Coase-Rawls model requiring use of the condition of hidden identity and
the principle of constructive empathy would still be "efficient," in the
sense that they would be transactions the parties would have entered into
freely ex ante knowing their alternatives and being risk averse." Risk
aversion is a social norm affecting choice.67 When parties act in response
to risk aversion, any resulting "equitable gain" will occur at some point
between the maximin" and the maximized total utility attainable.6 9 If no

65. See infra Part IV.C.

66. See infra PartIV.A.
67. See infra notes 281-306 and accompanying text.
68. The "maximin" utility is the combined net increase in utility where the worst-off or weaker
bargainer's benefits would be maximized, but at the cost of a lower marginal net increase in benefits
for the stronger party. Rawls, Posner claims, preferred a set of arrangements that maximized the
position of the worst off. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLmv, supra note 4, at 461.
69. The "maximized total utility" (in contrast with the "maximin") is the total combined net
increase in utility that is possible within a situation. Id. at 462. The maximum increase in benefits
may result in a 50/50 split between two parties to a bargain or, in theory, it could result in a 99/1
split, or anything in between, so long as whatever split there is results in the largest combined
increase in total utility-the largest pie versus the larger slice notion.
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resolution can be agreed upon that would be advantageous to all, the
parties will walk away. Agreements that do occur will increase total
welfare. The difference is that the increase in welfare will be more
equitably shared. An agreement so made (or emulated) will be both
efficient and fair.
II.

JUSTICE AS EFFICIENCY

The Coase Theorem is a powerful economic tool for considering
questions of efficiency and preference maximization. This tool allows for
a derivation of agreements that parties would reach if they could bargain
under a set of assumed conditions, including the assumptions that no
transaction costs would hinder the bargaining and that perfect
competition exists. Although these assumptions never hold true in real
markets, examining what would happen if they were true allows us to
comprehend and formulate policies and rules designed to promote
efficient dispute resolutions. While the Coase Theorem can help us
understand what is efficient, it alone cannot and was not meant to tell us
what would be a "fair" allocation of resources among or between the
parties.
A.

The Coase Theorem

In his 1960 article, The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase
introduced the proposition, now known as the "Coase Theorem," that if
market transactions are costless, a rearrangement of rights will always
take place if it would lead to an increase in production value.7" The topic
that Coase addressed in The Problem of Social Cost was negative
externalities.7 The Coase Theorem, however, has been applied in many
areas beyond the field of externalities, from the market for hepatitis-free
blood,72 to the appropriate Federal Communications Commission rules
70. Coase, Social Cost, supranote 4, at 15.
71. A negative externality is a divergence between the private cost of an activity and the social
cost of that activity. If such a divergence occurs, and there is no government or market action to
correct it, then the harmful activity, or the good that is produced by the harmful activity, will tend to
be over-produced relative to its value to society. This misallocation of resources occurs because the
cost structure faced by the producer does not reflect the true cost of production. Some examples of
this that Coase uses are a smoky factory, a cattle rancher whose cattle stray onto the neighboring
farmer's land, and a noisy confectioner next to a doctor's office. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 4,
passim.
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for cable television," to markets in intellectual property,74 to the
separation of powers and declarations of war.'
Coase's ideas have been widely discussed in both economic and legal
literature, and they have taken on a life of their own far beyond anything
Coase ever suggested. The Problem of Social Cost has become the most
cited article in both social science and legal literature.76 The following
restatements illustrate the wide range of functions attributed to the Coase

Theorem:
[U]nder perfect competition private and social costs will be equal.77
In a world of zero transaction costs, the allocation of resources will
be efficient, and invariant with respect to legal rules of liability,
income effects aside. 8
[R]esource allocation is efficient regardless of the structure of
liability law, providing that bargaining is frictionless.79
[I]f nothing obstructs efficient bargaining, then people will
negotiate until they reach Pareto efficiency."

72. Reuben A. Kessel, TransfusedBlood, Serum Hepatitis, and the Coase Theorem, 17 J.L. &

Econ. 265 (1974).
73. Stanley M. Besen et al., Copyright Liabilityfor Cable Television: CompulsoryLicensing and
the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. & Econ. 67 (1978).
74. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property,94 Colum. L. Rev.

2655 (1994).
75. J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 Duke L.J. 27 (1991).
76. Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem: Through a Glass Darkly, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 797, 806
n.40 (citing Institute for Sci. Info., Inc., Social Sciences Citation Index, and Fred R. Shapiro, The
Most-CitedLiv Review Articles, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1540, 1546 (1985)).

77. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 113 (1966). Coase credits Stigler with being the first
person to call the ideas in The Problem ofSocial Cost "The Coase Theorem." RH. Coase, Notes on
the Problem ofSocial Cost, in The Firm, the Market, and the Lav, supra note 4, at 157.
78. Richard 0. Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost in Retrospect, in 2 Research in Law and

Economics 83 (Richard 0. Zerbe ed., 1980).
79. Robert Cooter, The Cost ofCoase, 11 J. Legal Stud. 1,4 (1982).
80. Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 Econ. Persp. 113, 113 (1987). Pareto
efficiency is defined as reaching a state of optimality at which it is not possible for the parties to
make a trade that would make one party better off without making another party worse off. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 4, at 13. This is a stronger form of efficiency than KaldorHicks efficiency, which calls a transaction efficient if it increases total welfare, that is, if the benefit
from the transaction is enough greater than the harm from it that any harmed parties could be
compensated by parties made better off, whether or not the harmed parties actually are compensated.
Id. at 14. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has a broader scope than Pareto efficiency. If a transaction is
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The Coase Theorem uses the process of reaching a consensus-

bargaining-to discover the most efficient allocation of rights and
obligations. Coase argues that, given the ability of both parties to bargain

rationally without transaction costs, the allocation of resources will not
change regardless of which party begins with a particular entitlement."'
Consider a dispute between two firms because the pollution created by
one interferes with the production processes of the other. We can call one
firm Polluter and the other Recipient. If Polluter is liable for the damage

it causes Recipient, that is, if Recipient has an entitlement to be free from
pollution, Polluter will produce up to the point (QI*) at which the
marginal revenue of one more unit of its product, Product 1 (P1), is equal
to the marginal cost of producing that unit, including the cost of
compensating Recipient for the amount of damage to the production of
Product 2 (P2) caused by the production of P1. At levels of production
below that point, the increase in total revenues created by producing the

next unit is greater than the increase in total costs generated by producing
the next unit. At levels of production above Ql*, the cost of producing
the next unit is not justified by the increase in total revenue that the next

Pareto efficient, then it increases total welfare and it makes all parties to it better off. In contrast, if a
transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, it increases total welfare, but it does not necessarily make all
parties to it better off. A transaction that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient increases total welfare enough that
all parties could be compensated to make them better off, but Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not
require that they actually are compensated.
To illustrate the difference between Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiency, we can go back to the
farmer-rancher example. Let us say having one more head of cattle in his herd makes the rancher $10
better off. That additional head does $15 worth of damage to the farmer's crops. Now, compare two
possible resolutions to this situation. First, the farmer could make a bargain with the rancher to pay
the rancher $12 if the rancher refrains from adding one more head of cattle to his herd. Second, the
farmer could seek an injunction. A court could determine that the farmer has an entitlement to have
his land be free from trespassing livestock and grant the injunction.
In either of these cases, total welfare is increased by five dollars, so the result in both cases is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient. However, only the first resolution is Pareto efficient. The rancher is two
dollars better off and the farmer three dollars better off than if they had not entered into this bargain.
In the second situation, the farmer is $15 better off, and the rancher is $10 worse off than if the
injunction had not been granted.
Another way to look at this is to say that all of the parties affected would voluntarily enter into a
transaction if it is Pareto efficient However, if a transaction is only Kaldor-Hicks efficient, there will
be some parties that would not enter into the transaction voluntarily. The transaction would have to
be imposed by the government or the courts.
81. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 4, at 6-8. The word "entitlement," as used in discussing the
Coase Theorem, can mean anything from the right to pollute to the right to refuse to sell one's
property. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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unit of production will bring, and Polluter will not produce.82 If there are
no levels of production at which the marginal revenue of the next unit of
P1 is greater than the value of P2 that is destroyed by the production of
that unit, then Polluter will go out of business.
If Polluter is not liable for the damage that it causes and there is no
possibility of transactions between Polluter and Recipient, then Polluter
will produce up to the point at which the marginal revenue of producing
the next unit equals the marginal cost to Polluter of producing that unit.
This will not take into account the damage that the production of P1 does
to the production of P2. The marginal cost to Polluter of producing P1
will be less than the marginal cost to society of its production. Therefore,
the quantity of P1 produced will be greater then Q1*.
However, if Recipient does not have an entitlement to be free from
pollution, and there are no transaction costs between the parties,
according to Coase's argument, the allocation of resources will remain
the same as it would if Polluter were held liable for the damage it caused.
Polluter and Recipient will be able to reach a consensus that allocates
rights and obligations between the parties in the most efficient way
possible. For any level of production at which the value to Recipient of
the amount of P2 destroyed by the production of the next unit of P1 is
greater than the difference between the marginal revenue and marginal
cost of that unit of P1 (Polluter's profit on that unit), Recipient will be
willing to pay Polluter not to produce that unit. When Polluter is making
its decision as to whether or not to produce the next unit of P1, it will
take into account not only the marginal cost of producing that unit, but
also the amount of payment from Recipient that it will forgo by
producing it. 3 Therefore, Polluter will only produce up to the point at
which the marginal cost of producing the next unit plus the marginal
damage to the production of P2 is equal to the marginal revenue it will
receive for that unit of P1. This will be QI*.
Consequently, regardless of whether the Recipient has a right to be
free from pollution or not, if there are no transaction costs, Polluter will
produce up to the point at which the marginal social cost of that unit of
P1 (marginal cost of production plus the value of the amount of P2

82. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 4, at 3. This is just a restatement of one of the fundamental
principles of the economics of perfect competition, which is that firms will produce up to the point at
which marginal costs equal marginal revenue.

83. Id. at7.
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destroyed by producing it) is equal to the marginal revenue of that unit.'
While the liability rule may have distributional effects, in that it changes
which party has to compensate the other, it has no effect on the allocation
85
of resources, assuming no transaction costs.
B.

Assumptions Underlyingthe Coase Theorem

As Coase emphasizes, the ideas that became known as the Coase
Theorem were not meant to represent the real world.86 They describe a
world bounded by a number of underlying assumptions. Understanding
the nature and meaning of these assumptions is crucial to understanding
what the Coase Theorem means and to evaluating discussions and
applications of it.
Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer have written perhaps the
87
most complete summary of the assumptions behind the Coase Theorem:
(a)

two agents to each externality (and bargain),

(b)

perfect knowledge of one another's (convex) production and
profit or utility functions,

(c)

competitive markets,

(d)

zero transaction costs[,]

(e)

costless court system,

(f)

profit-maximizing producers and expected utility-maximizing
consumers,

(g) no wealth effects,
(h) [the striking by agents of] mutually advantageous bargains in
88
the absence of transaction costs.

84. See Adam Gifford, Jr. & Courtenay C. Stone, Externalities,Liability, and the Coase Theorem:
A Mathematical Analysis, II W. Econ. J. 260 (1973) (explicating mathematics behind this
argument); M.T. Maloney, Note, The Coase Theorem and Long-Run Industry Equilibrium, 17
Q. Rev. Econ. & Bus. 113 (graphically representing this argument).
85. Coase, supra note 59, at 13.
86. Id. at 14.
87. For this reason, this Part will rely on Hoffman and Spitzer's categorization of these

assumptions.
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In essence, "(b), (d), and (e) are all part of the same assumption, . . that
bargaining is costless."89 Several of these assumptions require further
explanation.
1.

Competitive Markets

Perfectly competitive markets are more readily understood in terms of
what they are not than what they are. A perfectly competitive market
operates in the absence of any monopoly power. No party to an
agreement in a competitive market is significant enough to influence the
market price or terms of agreement. There are no important differences
in the product of one firm as opposed to another. There is nothing in the
perfectly competitive market to prevent a new party from entering the
market. 90
In the competitive market, price is set by the intersection of the
industry supply curve and the demand curve for that product. The
industry demand curve is the horizontal summation of the demand curves
of all of the individual consumers in that market and is represented as
downward-sloping, because consumers are assumed to want less of a
product as the price of the product increases. The industry supply curve
is the horizontal summation of the supply curves of each of the firms in
that industry. The supply curve for each firm is the upward-sloping
portion of the marginal cost curve faced by that firm. 91
If the market is competitive, each individual firm within the industry
is assumed to be a price-taker. That is, the demand curve that each firm
faces is horizontal and is set at the intersection of the industry supply and
demand curves. No firm is large enough for its production decisions to
88. Hoffinan & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem, supra note 9, at 73. The assumption of perfect
knowledge requires that all parties understand the costs and benefits of a decision, both to
themselves and to other parties. "[It] means that consumers know the price charged by each
producer. Providers of inputs (laborers and owners of capital) know how much each producer will
pay for the resources they provide. Producers know the technology used by their competitors." Mark
Seidenfeld, Microeconomic Predicatesto Law and Economics 35 (1996).
89. Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 Comell L. Rev. 783, 789

(1990).
90. See, e.g., Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at 11.

91. Marginal costs represent the change in total cost with each unit of production. See id, at 8. The
assumption that the firm supply curve is the upward-sloping portion of its marginal cost curve is a
corollary of the assumption that the level of production at which profits are maximized, and therefore
at which firms will produce, will be the level at which the marginal cost of producing the final unit is
the same as the marginal revenue associated with that unit. See Seidenfield, supra note 88, at 29.
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affect market price. Products are also assumed to be homogenous, so that
the product of any one firm in an industry is identical to that of every

other firm in the industry. A common example is the market for a
particular grade of corn.
In competitive markets, entry is possible and will occur if the riskadjusted rate of return in that industry is higher than the risk-adjusted rate
of return available elsewhere. That is, if there are economic profits to be
made, firms will enter the market, increasing the quantity supplied and
driving down price. This means that, over time, the price for the product
is at the minimum of the long-run industry average cost curve, and there
are no economic profits.92
2.

Transaction Costs

The existence of zero transaction costs is the most important
assumption of the Coase Theorem. At the same time, for many, it may be
the most difficult to understand, because the term "transaction costs"
embraces many ideas. Pierre Schlag has identified two approaches to the
definition of transaction costs.93 One of these, which he calls the "ad
hoc" approach, lists problems that commonly result in transaction costs,
including free-rider,94 holdout,95 bilateral monopoly, 6 identification of
92. For a more mathematically oriented description of the economics of competitive markets, see
Allan C. DeSerpa, The Pure Economics of the Coase Theorem, 18 E. Econ. J. 287 (1992).
93. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1661, 1673-76
(1989).
94. A free-rider problem exists when the provider of a good or service is unable to capture all of
the value of that good or service because she is unable to exclude people from receiving the benefits
of it. This can be a problem with the provision of positive externalities, or "public goods," and with
the reduction of negative externalities. An example of this is pollution reduction. If a large group of
property owners must negotiate with a polluting factory to reduce the amount of pollution, each
property owner will have an incentive to understate how much she is willing to pay for the reduction
in pollution, on the assumption that "[i]f I refuse to contribute my fair share of the purchase price,
others, who care more deeply about pollution than I do, will make up the difference." Posner,
Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at 63. This may result in the parties not being able to reach
an agreement, even if the reduction in pollution is valued more highly than the cost to achieve it. Id.
95. A "holdout" problem may exist when there is a large number of parties on the side to be
compensated. Parties may have an incentive to overstate the value they place on the right being
purchased in order to gain a larger portion of the compensation. If enough of the parties do this, the
price for the entitlement will be too high, and the parties will be unable to reach an agreement, even
though the side attempting to purchase the right values it more highly than the side to be
compensated. Id. at 62-63.
96. A bilateral monopoly exists when both of the parties must negotiate with each other, if they
are to negotiate at all. An example of this would be an "employee... trained in a set of techniques
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contracting parties, information acquisition and production, policing of
agreements, detection of breach, enforcement of agreements, valuation
difficulties, and negotiation costs.97 These categories, Schlag says, have
the advantage of being easy to recognize and apply in legal cases.98
A better approach to transaction costs, according to Schlag, is the
"definitional" approach.99 The somewhat varying definitions of
"transaction costs" that have been offered by different economists
include:
Costs that occur "when trading partners attempt to identify and
contact one another (identification costs), when contracts are
negotiated (negotiation costs), and when the terms of the contracts
are verified and enforced (enforcement costs)."' 0
The costs of bringing bargainers together, maintaining and revising
the agreement, and the capital required to effect the agreement.'
The costs "like those of getting large numbers of people together to
bargain, and costs of excluding free loaders."0 2
The three classes of "search and information costs, bargaining and
decision costs, policing and enforcement costs [all of which amount
to losses] due to lack of information. " '° '
Transaction costs are likely to be higher in certain situations than in
others. Harold Demsetz examined transaction costs within the New York
Stock Exchange and found that the more a security is traded, the lower
unique to his particular employer, while his employer pays the training bill." Herbert Hovenkamp,
Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 293, 308 (1992). In such a case, "[t]he
employer is willing to pay a premium to retain an employee who is already trained; the employee is
worth more only to ... his current employer." Id.Bilateral monopoly may lead to strategic behavior,
on the part of both the employer and employee, that raises the costs of negotiation dramatically: for
example, a strike that shuts down a plant or a firm that provides income for both the employer and
employee.
97. Schlag, supra note 93, at 1673.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1674.
100. Id, at 1675 (quoting Peter G. Toumanoff, A Positive Analysis of Market Failure,37 Kyklos
529,531 (1984)).
101. Id. (citing E.J. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay,
9 J. Econ. Lit. 1, 16 (1971)).
102. Id. (quoting Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability RulesA Comment, I1 I.L. & Econ. 67, 68 n.5 (1968)).
103. Id. (quoting Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem ofExternality, 22 J.L. & Econ. 141, 148 (1979)).
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the transaction costs are for trading in that security.'" Further, the
standardization of a product makes buyers willing to "let others buy and
sell for them" and to purchase without personally examining the goods,
which Demsetz found also reduced transaction costs.' 5 Examining the
characteristics of various types of bargains, Oliver Williamson argued
that the characteristics that tend to increase transaction costs are a high
level of uncertainty, infrequent exchanges,
and the level to which
6
investments are transaction-specific.1
3.

Wealth Effects

A wealth, or income, effect is a change in the demand for a particular
good or entitlement caused by a change in wealth or income.' °7 The
reason that the absence of wealth effects is required as a background
assumption of the Coase Theorem may not be immediately clear.
However, one facet of the Theorem holds that the allocation of resources
does not change with a change in the liability rule.' This outcome
depends on the windfall gain or loss from the reallocation of an
entitlement either being planned for or not having a wealth effect. It is
possible that, if bargaining is costless, the potential for a change in the
legal rule will already be accounted for in agreements between parties, so
that all contingencies will be provided for and no redistribution of wealth
could occur. 9 A newly-recognized right that was not planned for in
previous agreements, however, may increase or decrease demand for
some goods. If the right being created is new, and it could not have been
planned for in previous agreements, the potential wealth effect is large;
and if the change in demand for certain products is great enough to affect
the price of those products, then a change in the liability rule may have
an effect on the distribution of resources in the long run. Thus,
transactions in the context of the Coase Theorem must be assumed to
occur in the absence of wealth effects.

104. Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. Econ. 33, 50 (1968).

105. Id.
106. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233, 261 (1979).
107. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at 51.
108. See supranotes 81-85 and accompanying text.
109. Coase, supranote 77, at 173.
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4.

Rationality

The premise that producers and consumers will strike mutually
advantageous bargains if there are no transaction costs, crucial to the
Coase Theorem, derives from the assumption that the parties are rational.
One part of this assumption, basic to economic analysis, as Gary Becker
has stated, is that "individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it,
whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.""'
Thus, parties will not ignore opportunities to increase their welfare by
way of a bargain.
5. PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability
The distinctions among property rules, liability rules, and
inalienability are more in the nature of definitions than assumptions.
However, several of the arguments about and implications of the Coase
Theorem require an understanding of these distinctions. This topic and
how it relates to the Coase Theorem was first examined by Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed." They divide the question of
entitlement into two parts: first, which party receives the entitlement, and
second, what form does it take." 2 The party that society decides to favor
is the party that receives the entitlement."
An entitlement is protected by a property rule if the entitlement can be
purchased from the holder for a price the buyer and the seller agree upon
in a voluntary transaction." 4 This method of protecting an entitlement
requires the least amount of government involvement, because it is up to
the parties to determine the entitlement's value. The seller may refuse
5
any offer that is not high enough to meet the seller's own valuation."

110. Becker, Nobel Lecture, supra note 4, at 386; see also Jon Elsten, More Than Enough, 64
U. Chi. L. Rev. 749, 761 (1997) (book review) (stating that "the concept ofrationality is subjective
through and through").
111. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, and Inalienability:
One View ofthe Cathedral,85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
112. Id,
at 1090-92.
113. Id. at 1090.
114. Id. at 1092.
115. Id.
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Examples of property protections include "restraining orders,
specific
' 16
performance clauses, and certain types of punitive sanctions."'
A liability rule means that the other party may destroy the entitlement
if he or she is willing to compensate the entitlement-holder for it at some
value set by the State or the courts." 7 Examples of liability protections
include expectation damages, the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment," 8 and compulsory licenses." 9
An entitlement is considered inalienable if it cannot be bought or sold
even by voluntary participants."' For example, people are not allowed to
sell themselves into slavery, certain types of pornography may not be
sold, and various goods may not be sold to minors.'
Calabresi and Melamed point out that many entitlements are protected
by more than one type of rule. They cite a house as an example of an
entitlement that is normally protected by a property rule in circumstances
involving an ordinary sale, covered by a liability rule when it comes to
government takings, and inalienable when a party to the transaction is
incompetent."
Each of these assumptions and definitions must be remembered when
evaluating the Coase Theorem. Many of the criticisms and tests of
the Coase Theorem are relevant only if the assumptions underlying the
Coase Theorem are weakened or ignored. Weakening these assumptions
may make the model under which these critics are working more
reflective of the real world, but such attacks may be more a criticism of
the divergence between the real world and the Coasean world than of the
Coase Theorem itself.24 This divergence is what prompts the need for a
116. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.L 1027, 1037 (1995).
117. Calabresi & Melamed, supranote I11, at 1092.
118. U.S. Const. amend. V.
119. Ayres & Talley, supra note 116, at 1037.
120. Calabresi & Melamed, supranote 111, at 1092.
121. Id. at 1112-13.
122. Id. at 1093.
123. Id.
124. It has been pointed out that "the Coasean world" is not an appropriate title to give to the
world in which the assumptions underlying the Coase Theorem are true, since "[tihe 'Coasean
world' is not only not Coase's world but, ironically, is more like the world of the economic
theoretists that Coase has attacked." Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against
Coaseanism, 99 Yale L.J. 611, 611 (1989). However, the phrase is a convenient appellation to give
to the world described by the Coase Theorem and is often so used.
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more realistic model. Coase has never claimed that the Coase Theorem
describes what would happen in the real world; in fact, he has argued
very strenuously that it does not reflect the real world at all."u
It is also important to keep these assumptions in mind when
evaluating the validity of implications that have been drawn from the
Coase Theorem. If policy prescriptions depend too heavily on Coasean
assumptions being true, then they may not be appropriate in the many
circumstances in which the assumptions do not hold true.
C.

Policy Implications of the Coase Theorem

1.

Moving from the Hypothetical Coasean World to the Real World

While the Coase Theorem is informative in the abstract, its
assumptions make the world in which the theorem operates far different
from the real one, as Coase himself acknowledges.' 2 6 In the hypothetical
realm of no transaction costs, the Coase Theorem implies that the
assignment of rights would not be important in terms of economic
efficiency, because, regardless of which party received an entitlement,
the parties would bargain to achieve the Pareto optimal allocation of
resources. 27 But bargaining is not costless, and information is not
perfect. Wealth effects do exist, and not all markets are perfectly
competitive. Thus, in the real world, any chosen legal rule has an effect
on the allocation of resources.' 28 As Coase suggested, the introduction of
"positive transaction costs" is required to analyze real-world events.'29
In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase was not arguing for a particular
policy prescription. Rather, he was arguing against the idea that external
effects always require government intervention. He noted that "[a]ll
solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose that government
regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled
by the market or the firm."' 3 O Rather than making a change because the
situation in the real world is different than it would be in an ideal world,
125. Coase, supranote 59, at 15.
126. Id
127. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
128. Coase, supra note 77, at 175; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 4, at 52; Cento
G. Veljanovski, The Coase Theorem-The Says Law of Welfare Economics?, 53 Econ. Rec. 535, 539

(1977).
129. Coase, supranote 59, at 15.
130. Coase, Social Cost,supra note 4, at 18.
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Coase advocated comparing the effects that different solutions would
have in the real world and choosing the solution that would maximize
total welfare. He wrote:
[I]n choosing between social arrangements within the context of
which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a
change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in
some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others.
Furthermore we have to take into account the costs involved in
operating the various social arrangements (whether it be the
working of a market or of a government department), as well as the
costs involved in moving to a new system. In devising and
choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for
the total effect.'3 '
Thus, Coase was not advocating a particular policy, but a particular
method of determining policy. While the Coase Theorem has been very
influential, Coase's argument that policy analysis should involve
comparing the real-world effects of various potential policies is a
critically important insight. Despite this aim, the Coasean method has
been used by a number of law and economics scholars to suggest policies
for specific situations.
2.

The Role of Negotiation in Rulemaking

An important consideration in comparing different policy rules is to
remember the role that negotiation can play in changing a rule. Although
private negotiation cannot solve all allocation problems with transaction
costs, its existence should not be ignored, and the possibility of
correcting problems in this way should be considered in comparing
different systems. As Joseph Farrell observes, "One institution may
nicely solve problems that would in any case easily be negotiated away,
but leave gaping holes that negotiation cannot plug; another may do
badly on many problems, but they may be problems that negotiation can
readily solve."' 32 For this reason, Farrell suggests that "a two-stage
evaluation of institutions" is required. 3 We should first examine the
"outcomes the institution by itself will yield," and then, "before

131. Id. at 44.
132. Farrell, supra note 80, at 125.
133. Id
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evaluating its overall efficiency, ask how far its problems Will be
34
repaired by negotiation."'
3.

Indicationsfor Market-BasedPolicies

In considering the level of transaction costs, it should be noted that
there are certain circumstances in which the best solution might be to
allow the market to solve the problem. Transaction costs may be so low
that bargaining is likely to reach a more efficient result than the
government or the courts would. George Daly indicates that this may be
the case When "(a) the number of parties involved in the externality is
small, and (b) competition prevails in that market.' ' 13 Joseph Farrell also
states that private negotiation may be better than a government-imposed
solution when (a) private information exists; (b) the government is
unable to effectively use that information; (c) artificial barriers do not
exist to block voluntary private contracts; and (d) the negotiating parties
are few and easily identified.'3 6 Farrell cautions, however, that the
presence of private information may still prevent the market solution
13 7
from being the best solution.
4.

Reduction of TransactionCosts

One policy that may be appropriate in circumstances in which
transaction costs are high is reduction of transaction costs where
possible. 3 ' Transaction costs are likely to be higher when there is a great
deal of uncertainty, when exchanges in a good are infrequent, when
trading is decentralized, and when products are not standardized. 3 9 For
134. Id.
135. George Daly, The Coase Theorem: Assumptions, Applications, and Ambiguities, 12 Econ.
Inquiry 203, 208-09 (1974). Another approach to the situation in which transaction costs are low is
that taken by Stewart Schwab. See Stewart Schwab, CoaseDefends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and
Economists Do Not, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1171, 1195 (1989) (reviewing Coase, The Firm, the Market,
and the Law, supra note 4). Schwab points out that if transaction costs are low, "The law has no
reason to award entitlements to those willing and able to pay the most for it because, under zero
transaction costs, the needy or deserving holders of the entitlement can trade it without any
efficiency loss to those willing and able to pay more." Id. Schwab restates this as what he calls "The
DistributiveCorollaryof the Coase Theorem: With zero transaction costs, initial entitlements cannot
be justified on efficiency grounds, and so should be awarded on the basis of need or desert." Id.
136. Farrell, supra note 80,at 124.
137. Id
138. Craswell,supra note 38, at 633.
139. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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example, since transaction costs are lower when there is greater certainty,
an appropriate policy might be for courts to "concern themselves not so
much with the140substance of the legal rule as with its certainty and
predictability."'
A related policy consideration is the existence of private information.
Ian Ayres and Eric Talley suggest that a divided entitlement protected by
a liability rule may reduce high transaction costs if the reason that they
They say that
are high is the existence of private information.
"[p]rivate information is a particularly pernicious form of transaction
cost, especially in legal contexts where, for procedural or other reasons,
parties must negotiate within 'thin' markets.' 42 Where there is private
information, parties have an incentive to bargain strategically and
deceive the other party as to the goods' true valuations in order to gain a
greater proportion of the bargaining surplus. 43 Ayres and Talley argue:
[E]ndowing each bargainer with a share of the underlying
entitlement creates the possibility of two different types of Coasean
trade: A bargainer might buy the other party's claim, or
alternatively, she might sell her own. During negotiation, each
party is likely to be uncertain about whether she will ultimately
emerge as a seller or a buyer.'"
A rule of this type is often used in partnership agreements, which
typically have provisions that if one partner wishes to dissolve the
partnership, that partner must "name a firm value and then let the other
owner choose whether to buy ...or sell."'45 Because that partner does
not know if he or she will be buying or selling, there is motivation to
reveal private information, that is, what the firm is worth to him or her.
Ayres and Talley recommend a rule of this sort when transaction46costs
are high due to private information, as a way to reduce those costs.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Craswell, supra note 38, at 632.
Ayres & Talley, supra note 116, at 1029-30.
Id. at 1030.
Id.

144. Id.
145. Id at 1072.
146. See id.
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5.

Assignment to the PartyHaving the Lowest TransactionalCosts

In certain instances, transaction costs may not be symmetrical. This
means that one party may more easily change an inefficient rule than
another.'47 Both E.J. Mishan and Alan Randall argue that pollutionrelated externalities are likely to have this characteristic, and that in such
a case the appropriate policy is probably to make the polluter liable.'48
[Because] transaction costs are likely to be larger when
negotiations must be initiated by a large and diffuse group of
individuals rather than by a much smaller group of individuals who
are more vitally interested in this particular issue, it follows that in
cases of pollution from industrial sources, [a no liability] rule is
more likely than is the [full liability] rule to result in transaction
costs too high for the achievement of a solution other than the
149
status quo.

For this reason, Randall argues that a full-liability rule will be more
likely to increase social welfare than a no-liability rule.15
6.

Assignment to the PartyMost Valuing the Right

In some cases, the appropriate policy may be for the law to allocate
rights or duties as the parties most often would themselves if they could
negotiate without transaction costs."' This reduces transaction costs
because, for all of the parties for which that allocation is optimal, this
policy eliminates the need for negotiation on that issue.'52 Even more
important is the fact that:
[I]f the parties are simply unable to negotiate-say because the
costs of negotiating are prohibitively high, or because strategic
posturing prevents them from reaching an agreement-then the
only way to reach an efficient outcome is for the legal rule to

147. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note I 11, at 1119; Mishan, supra note 101, at 23.
148. Mishan, supra note 101, at 23; Alan Randall, Market Solutions to Externality Problems:
Theory and Practice,54 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 175, 178 (1972).

149. Randall, supranote 148, at 178.
150. Id
151. Craswell, supra note 38, at 633; Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at 93.
152. Craswell, supra note 38, at 633.
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supply the remedy to which the parties would have negotiated had
they been able."
Craswell, the adoption of this
In many situations, according to Richard
54
welfare'
total
maximize
will
policy
7.

PropertyRules Versus Liability Rules

Another important policy decision, and one that has generated much
discussion in legal and economic literature, is when a rule should take
the form of a property rule and when it should take the form of a liability
rule. 55 Property rules require less government intervention, in that they
do not require the government to place a possibly inaccurate valuation on
an entitlement. At the same time, because the price is already set with
liability rules, property rules may reduce the need for negotiating and
thus reduce transaction costs.
Calabresi and Melamed argue that the most efficient rule when
transaction costs are low is a property rule. 56 They point out that this is
true even when it is not clear that the entitlement chosen is the efficient
one, since the parties can easily bargain to correct any error. 157 In that
case, they add, "While the entitlement might have important distribu5
tional effects, it will not substantially undercut economic efficiency."'
When transaction costs are high, however, a liability rule may be a
more efficient solution than a property rule. 59 Richard Posner writes
about pollution rights:
In the presence of high transaction costs, absolute (i.e., unqualified)
rights, whether to pollute or to be free of pollution, are likely to be
inefficient. The factory that has the absolute right to pollute will, if
transaction costs are prohibitive, have no incentive to stop (or
reduce) pollution even if the cost of stopping would be much less
than the cost of pollution to the homeowners. Conversely,
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra Part II.B.5 (discussing distinctions between liability and property rles).
156. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1118.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Posner, Economic Analysis of Lav, supra note 4, at 63; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
111, at 1107; Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule ofLiability Matter?, I J. Legal Stud. 13, 26-27
(1972).
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homeowners who have an absolute right to be free from pollution

will, if transaction costs are again prohibitive, have no incentive to
take steps of their own to reduce the effects of pollution even if the
cost to them of doing so (perhaps by moving away) is 16less than the
cost to the factory of not polluting or of polluting less.'
These concerns are particularly likely to be important when there are
free-rider or holdout problems, as is likely to be 161
the case in a context in
which there are many parties on at least one side.
D.

Critiques of the Coase Theorem

The Coase Theorem has been the focus of some of the most spirited
debate in both legal and economic literature. Opponents of the Coase
Theorem have suggested that it is invalid because it does not hold true in
the long run,62 it does not take account of risk, 63 it depends on the
existence of economic rents to be true,"6 it depends on the convexity of
the production function, 65 it does not take account of the possibility of
strategic behavior, 6 6 it does not truly reflect consumer behavior, 67 and it

160. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at 63.
161. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1106-07; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law,
supranote 4, at 62-63.
162. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Decisionfor Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1965); Donald H. Regan, The Problem ofSocial Cost Revisited, 15
J.L. & Econ. 427 (1972); William Schulze & Ralph C. D'Arge, The CoaseProposition,Information
Constraints,and Long-Run Equilibrium, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 763 (1974). Calabresi later rethought
his position and argued that the liability rule would not, after all, affect the long-run allocation of
resources. Guido Calabresi, supra note 102, at 67.
163, Posin, supra note 76, at 832-44. Posin also attempted to disprove the Coase Theorem in a
previous article: Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem: If Pigs Could Fly, 37 Wayne L. Rev. 89
(1990). That article was widely criticized, and Posin himself later admitted that it was wrong because
it failed to consider opportunity cost. Posin, supra note 76, at 799-801.
164. Regan, supranote 162, at 433; David L. Shapiro, A Note on Rent and the Coase Theorem,
7 J. Econ. Theory 125 (1974); Stanislaw Wellisz, On External Diseconomies and the GovernmentAssisted Invisible Hand, 31 Economica 345, 351 (1964). The economic rent that an activity creates
"consists of the difference between what a factor of production earns in a given activity and what it
could earn in the best alternative activity." Coase, supra note 77, at 165.
165. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis As a Potentially Defective Product.
A Buyer's Guide to Posner'sEconomic Analysis of Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1655, 1675-76 (1974);
David A. Starrett, FundamentalNon-Convexities in the Theory of Externalities,4 J. Econ. Theory
180 (1972); Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass Law, 16
J. Legal Stud. 149, 154-60 (1987).
166. See Regan, supranote 162, at 429-30.
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raises the possibility of extortion. 6 ' Meanwhile, Coase's defenders have

responded to these articles by pointing out the weaknesses in the
critiques and the ways in which they misstate or misunderstand the

Coase Theorem. 69
Among the most convincing criticisms of the validity of the Coase
Theorem is that put forth by proponents of construction theory,7 7 among
others, that the assumption of rationality does not accurately describe
how consumers actually behave. Cass R. Sunstein points out that in
actuality, the decisions that people make are strongly influenced by
social norms.' 7 ' Norms, he notes, are "social attitudes of approval and
disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be
done.' 72 It is claimed that social norms better predict the actions of

market participants than assumptions about rationality do. For example,
"people contribute to a shared good, and refuse to free ride, far more
167. Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 669,678-95 (1979).
168. See, e.g., George Daly & J. Fred Giertz, Externalities, Extortion, and Efficiency, 65 Am.
Econ. Rev. 997 (1975).
169. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 Va. L. Rev. 655, 671
(1988); Robert D. Cooter, How the Law Circumvents Starrett's Nonconvexity, 22 J. Econ. Theory
499 (1980); Demsetz, supra note 159, at 19; Hovenkamp, supra note 89, at 789-93; Steven G.
Medema, Through a Glass Darkly or Just Wearing Dark Glasses? Posin, Coase, and the Coase
Theorem, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 1041 (1995); G. Warren Nutter, The Coase Theorem on Social Cost:
A Footnote, 11 J.L. & Econ. 503 (1968); Matthew Spitzer & Elizabeth Hoffman, A Reply to
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1187 (1980); Zerbe, supra note 78, at 89.
170. Construction theory concerns the ways that social meanings are constructed and changed.
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 949-51
(1995). According to this school of thought, "Human reality is not provided at birth by the physical
universe, but rather must be fashioned by individuals out of the culture into which they are born." Id,
at 949 n.19 (quoting David Kertner, Ritual, Politics, and Power 3-4 (1988)); see also Peter L.
Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of
Knowledge (1966); Jon Elster, The Cement ofSociety: A Study ofSocial Order(1989); Symposium,
Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996).
171. See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 9, at 945 (noting that "[w]hen people appear to
behave irrationally, in the sense that they violate predictions based on economic assumptions, it is
often because social norms are at work").
172. Id. at 914. Sunstein points out:
inhere are socials norms about nearly every aspect of human behavior. There are norms about
littering, dating, smoking, singing, when to stand, when to sit, when to show anger, when, how,
and with whom to express affection, when to talk, when to listen, when to discuss personal
matters, when to use contractions, when (and with respect to what) to purchase insurance.
Id. "The persistent urge to conform to social norms has been demonstrated in a good deal of work in
social psychology." Id at 915 nA1.
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often than economists predict."'7' Another example of this is the
"endowment effect," that is, the fact that "[t]he initial grant of an
entitlement of some good X to some person A can make A value X far
more than he would if X had been initially allocated to B."1' Similarly,
people may insist that they be paid more to give up a right than they are
willing to pay to prevent the loss.175 Social norms regarding the perceived
"fairness of bargains" have also been demonstrated to weaken the
presumption of rational self-maximizing bargaining. We discuss this
"fairness effect" in Part IV.B below.
For the most part, the literature described above attacks perceived
weaknesses in the Coase Theorem's assumptions and theoretical
structure. However, there also exists literature criticizing the Coase
Theorem and the law and economics movement in general on grounds
that have nothing to do with the theorem's theoretical correctness. The
Coase Theorem has been attacked from both the left and the right on
moral and equitable grounds. One of the harshest criticisms has been that
the Coase Theorem places efficiency above other values that are equally
if not more important.'76
Charles Fried criticizes Coasean reasoning-or what he calls the
economic analysis of rights-for removing the consideration of moral
and distributional objectives from the determination of rights.'
Fried
points out that the economic analysis of rights uses a concept of
efficiency that is removed from distributional questions.'7 8 He argues that
while economic analysis may tell us what is an efficient allocation of
resources, it does not consider whether that distribution is fair or just.'79
The outcome of a Coasean analysis depends, Fried says, on the "initial
endowments and assignments of rights; that is, it is a function of the

173. Id. at 945.
174. Id. at 942.
175. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 249 (1997). For example, "[o]ne study
found that people would demand about five times as much to allow destruction of trees in a park as
they would pay to prevent the destruction of those same trees." Id.
176. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 81-107 (1978); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe,
Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46
S. Cal. L. Rev. 617 (1973).
177. See Fried, supra note 176, at 81-107.

178. Id. at 93.
179. See id.at 94.
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distribution with which the bargaining parties begin."'' ° The fact that a
given outcome is efficient, Fried states, should not give it "any privileged
claim to our approbation.''. While "the attainment of efficiency," unlike
the achievement of distributional justice, may "have the virtue of
offering a clear and unambiguous criterion of social policy," that is not
reason enough to make efficiency the criterion for social policy. 2
Fried believes that economic analysis comes down to the notion that
"[e]fficiency is one thing, distribution another."'8 3 He calls this approach
"the sundering of ethical decisions from decisions about rights."' 4 He
contends that the removal of ethical and moral considerations from our
review of entitlements results in the view that the allocation of our rights
depends on the efficiency that results. 5 Under this view, "[r]ights cannot
be thought of as expressive of the moral position which one has in
entering into bargains or relations with others."'8 6 This contradicts, Fried
says, "the nonconsequentialist, categorical conception of rights."' 87 The
economic analysis of rights, Fried believes, suffers the same problem that
all utilitarian forms of analysis share, to wit:
[It] offers no way of giving substantive content to the concept of
the person, all characteristics being available for adjustment as the
optimific calculus might dictate, all attributes of the person being
contingent. The person finally becomes an abstract point, to which
pleasure and pain may be attributed, but with no dimension or
shape of its own.'
In Fried's view, this vision of rights as secondary, or as a means to the
goal of efficiency, is "the very opposite of the theory of rights that we
want."' 89 Fried argues for a conception of rights as "elaborated from the
concept of the person and what is necessary to establish the integrity of
the person."' 9°
180. Id. at 93.
181. Id. at 93-94.
182. Id. at 94.
183. Id. at 96.

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.

187. Id. at 97.
188. Id. at 104.
189. Id.
190. Id.at 105.
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Duncan Kennedy also raises normative objections to the use of
Coasean reasoning to solve legal problems.' First, he argues that the
application of cost-benefit analysis to real-world problems implicitly
requires the analyst to make normative decisions. 2 He states that if
economic analysis is to determine the "ideal private law," we will have to
make value judgments that are "more controversial, because more
overtly political," than simply saying that we should make changes
whose benefits to the gainers exceed costs to the losers. 93 He adds that,
under the Coasean model, "We try to imagine how the process of
bargaining over resource use would have come out, if there had been no
transaction costs, assuming that everyone exercised their rights under
existing law. Then we modify the existing set of entitlements to replicate
that result."' 94 The problem with this approach, he argues, is that it
"skew[s] the efficiency calculus as far as possible toward maintaining the
existing order of things."' 95
Another critic, Laurence Tribe, argues that economic analysis is not
appropriate in the political context, because political decisionmaking
should give weight to moral and ethical considerations. 96 A weakness
Tribe sees with economic analysis as a method of setting policy is that it
considers what people's preferences are, but it does not consider what
their preferences "should be."' 97 Tribe uses the example of a community
that must determine whether to build a dam that will have economic
benefits, but will destroy wilderness areas and perhaps species of birds
and animals.' 98 Tribe suggests that using economic analysis to determine
whether to build the dam might help the community determine "how
much its inhabitants do in fact value birds and other wildlife as
compared... with boating and other activities.""' However, economic
analysis "could not enable the community's inhabitants to think about
what the value systems ought to be-about the extent to which theirs

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Kennedy, supra note 176.
See id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 415.
Id. at419.
See Tribe, supra note 176, at 655-60.

197. Id. at 656.
198. Id. at 655.
199. Id. at 656.
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should be a wildlife-valuing community.""2 Tribe does not suggest that
economic analysis should be abandoned, but only that "it should always
be enriched by attempts" to consider the substance of rights as well.20 '
Despite these criticisms, there can be little doubt that the Coase
Theorem provides us with a superb analytical tool that can demonstrate
how bargains can be made efficient and how rights, liabilities, and
entitlements can be allocated toward that end. The weakness of the Coase
Theorem comes not from the assumptions that it requires-these are a
necessary part of any economic model-but from the lack of
understanding what these assumptions mean. Both attackers and
defenders of the Coase Theorem must keep in mind that the Coasean
world is not the real world, and that there are real-world effects of which
the Coase Theorem does not take account. Although the Coase Theorem
can tell us what is efficient, it alone cannot determine if what is efficient
will also be fair.
III.

JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

In contrast to the late-twentieth-century emphasis on justice as
efficiency by certain theorists, justice as fairness has been a theme of the
common law from its earliest times through the present.20 2 Equalityseeking and redistributive principles of justice, although of ancient
origin, are always undergoing new packaging. At times, notions of
justice have centered primarily on form and process, on dispensing
justice "according to the rules."2 3 More recently, the focus on fairness
has included a greater emphasis on substantive notions and on a
perceived need to use the law for redressing and adjusting inequalities of
both the opportunities for seeking society's scarce resources and the
resulting allocation of those resources.2" It may be the ultimate
reductionism to claim that the reams of commentaries proclaiming justice
as equality and fairness come down to the ancient maxim: what you

200. Id.
201. Id.at 659.
202. Charles M. Haar & Daniel William Fessler, The Wrong Side of the Tracks: A Revolutionary
Rediscovery ofthe Common Law Tradition ofFairnessin the StruggleAgainst Inequality 15 (1986).
203. Jerold S.Auerbach, Justice Without Law? 143 (1983).
204. See, e.g., H. Haywood Bums, Law and Race in America, in The Politics ofLaw, supra note
5, at 89; Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordinationand the
Rule ofLaw, in The Politics ofLaw, supra note 5, at 117.
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would not have done to you, do not do to others." 5 In other words, do not
treat me differently or with less respect because of my gender, race, age,
national origin, appearance, physical or mental condition, or other
economic and social conditions-or, to invert this ethical proscription
into a positive command, do for me what you would have me do for you.

From this edict it follows that one should care for others, especially those
in need.
A.

An Ethic of Care

How a person conceptualizes the bases of obligations goes a long way
in explaining that person's view of justice.20 6 In recent years, a growing,
predominantly feminist literature has advanced the notion that caring
about the needs of others is a strong normative basis for legal
obligations.0 7 Psychologist Carol Gilligan has argued that women tend to
have more of a "care perspective" than men, who tend to conceptualize
obligations in terms of substantive rights and duties and procedural
impartiality."3 She labeled the latter orientation the "justice perspective,"
which alternatively is referred to as the "rights" orientation. 0 9
205. See Matthew 7:12 (King James) (citing Jesus as stating that "all things whatsoever you
would that men should do to you, do you even so to them"); Luke 6:31 (King James) (quoting Jesus
as stating that "as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise"). Twenty years
before Jesus, Rabbi Hillel put the same proposition in the negative. 7 The Interpreter'sBible 329
(1951). Some earlier Latin translations of the Bible also cast Jesus' version of this so-called "Golden
Rule" in the negative. Hobbes, Leviathan, supranote 41, at 110. The Golden Rule has been taught in
positive or negative form by Lao-tzu, Confucius, and Plato. 7 The Interpreter'sBible,supra, at 329.
206. Compare Kant's categorical imperative that justice requires the keeping of promises because
one must only act by those rules that one could will to become universal law," see S. K6mer, Kant
136-37 (1955), with the law and economics' efficient-breach-of-contract thesis, which sanctions the
failure to keep promises when the Pareto-efficient result would occur consequent to a breach, as
explained in Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 4, at 118-20; see also Polinsky, supra
note 4, at 31-38.
207. The current literature on empathy finds its modem emphasis especially in the writings of
psychologist Carol Gilligan. See, e.g., Gilligan, supra note 8. In In a Different Voice, Gilligan argues
that women, more than men, see obligations as emerging from the needs of others rather than from
imposed notions of impartial procedures and substantive rights. Id. at 5-23; see also Joyce E.
McConnell, Relational and Liberal Feminism: The "Ethic of Care," Fetal Personhood and
Autonomy, 99 w. Va. L. Rev. 291 (1996).
208. Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientationand Moral Development, in Women and Moral Theory 19
(Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987). Gilligan argues that both justice (defined as a
male orientation) and care (a female orientation) are significant:
Theoretically, the distinction between justice and care cuts across the familiar divisions between
thinking and feeling, egoism and altruism, theoretical and practical reasoning. It calls attention
to the fact that all human relationships, public and private, can be characterized both in terms of
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Also focusing on an obligation of care, Judith Areen has observed that
a caring orientation involves several facets.2 1 First, a person responding
to another in need must be caring without being either demeaning or
paternalistic. 2" Second, the caretaker, to be capable of caring for others,
must take care of himself or herself.2"' Third, family or relational caring
does not have a clear starting or ending time.2" 3 More significantly,
Areen suggests that an ethic of care is a foundational basis for societal as
well as personal obligations.1 4 Despite being critiqued as sentimental,
she contends that an ethic of care may be "not merely a virtue, but a
source of principles" for law and justice.2" 5 For example, in suggesting
how society and its laws ought to respond to the AIDS epidemic, Areen
argues that an ethic of care requires society to take on specific
obligations toward its victims. 2 16 Thus, caring goes beyond a purely
subjective and discretionary response; it is obligatory in nature.
Areen points out that an ethic of care is not to be confused with
sentiment, pity, or compassion. Rather, it is to be conceptualized as "the
central virtue for sustaining human relationships and communities.' 2 7
Care is, in essence, a strong source of the social obligation one person
owes all others in the community. Areen notes that care is essential
because it makes possible the building of key social relationships,

equality and in terms of attachment, and that both inequality and detachment constitute grounds
for moral concern. Since everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two
moral visions-one of justice and one of care-recur in human experience. The moral
injunctions, not to act unfairly to others, and not to turn away from someone in need, capture
these different concerns.
Id. at 20.
In response to Gilligan, Judith Areen has written that the potential incompatibility between a
caring or empathetic perspective and the traditional rights-oriented perspective "is an ancient
theme," citing Sophocles's dialogue as an example. Areen, supra note 23, at 1076-77. Margaret
Jane Radin has opined that a "feminist middle way" would incline human beings both to be caring
and to seek justice. Radin, supranote 8,at 1718.
209. Gilligan, supra note 208, at 20-24.
210. Areen, supra note 23, at 1075.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1076.
215. Id.
216. Id.at 1078-82.
217. Id. at 1076.
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including those of families, households, and communities-be they
neighborhoods or nations. 1 8
The perceived irrationality of the justice-as-care thesis has been the
topic of considerable debate. Certain critics argue that care is not so
much a consequence of rational consideration as of subjective and
intuitive feeling." 9 But some feminists, including Cynthia Ward, have
suggested that feeling and imagination are aspects of reason and
22 This is a critical insight, for it argues that a caring
understanding.
disposition includes the assimilation of another dimension of knowledge
that can be rationally used in decisional contexts.
B.

Fairnessas Empathy

If society were governed only by an ethic-of-care principle for
determining the "justice" of legal rules and entitlements, any form of
governance could result."2 Indeed, a government might attempt to
control the marketplace completely by deciding what goods and services
are to be produced, what the prices will be, who is eligible for receiving
these resources, and in what amounts those will be allocated, all
according to central planners' dictates. But history suggests that such
controlled economies aspiring for the greater social good do not deliver
what they initially promise. An ethic-of-care principle alone as the
driving moral authority for a government's interference in the lives of its
citizens fails to recognize the still valid, invisible hand of laissez-faire
economics-people generally are better off overall when they are
allowed to seek and maximize their preferences in an open marketplace,

218. Id. (citing Alisdaire Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theology (2d ed. 1984)).
219. Rational choice theorists criticize what is claimed to be the modem sociologist's view that
people are "pawns of social forces." See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, The Strategic Role ofthe Emotions,
5 Rationality & Soc'y 160 (1993) (responding to James Coleman's 1990 book, Foundations of
Social Theory).
220. "[Ihe understanding gained through projective empathy is both rational and emotional."
Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and
Communitarian Literature, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 929, 938 (1994) (emphasis added); see also
Henderson, supra note 29, at 1576 ("Empathy is a form of understanding, a phenomenon that
encompasses affect as well as cognition .... [It is not] 'intuition.").
221. Richard Posner has suggested that a theory of distributive justice based on maximizing the
benefits for the worst-off members of society would be "compatible with on the one hand out-andout socialism and on the other hand laissez-faire capitalism." Posner, Economic Analysis of Law,
supra note 4, at 462-63.
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and governmental interference is confined to making the marketplace
more efficient."
An open, accessible marketplace allows citizens to imagine, create,
produce, distribute, exchange, and share scarce resources in such a
manner that everyone should be better off in the end. After all, it takes
profits to pay taxes that pay benefits and provide services, such as
medical care, for those unable to pay for them. The very success of free
markets and constrained capitalism allows for a modified redistributive
welfare state. But free markets without redistributive features lead to
growing income and resource disparities.
What is true about macroeconomics is also true about microeconomics. The key question becomes how to synthesize two themes of
justice: wealth maximization through permitting and emulating efficient
exchanges, and maintenance of a "fair" net increase in utility for each
party so as to prevent disproportionate gains by the stronger marketplace
participants. Such a synthesis requires a meaningful definition of "fair."
But how do we determine what fairness means? One way is to isolate and
focus on a key aspect of the ethic of care, the human capacity for
reasoned empathy.
Lynne N. Henderson has become a leading theorist for integrating
what she purposefully calls "empathy" (rather than care) into the law.
She acknowledges that empathy is a mix of rational with irrational
elements.' 23 On the emotional side, one's empathetic thought process, she
has written, includes a distress response that may (but not must) cause
one to take action to ease the pain of another.224
Empathy's relationship to rationality is more complex.22 Susan
Bandes has noted that empathy is an instrumental concept---"not an
emotion.., but rather a capacity, a tool used to achieve a variety of
'
ends."226
Empathy is not limited to one's emotional response to
222. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993)
(1776).
223. Henderson, supra note 29, at 1579.
224. Lynne Henderson, The DialogueofHeart andHead,10 Cardozo L. Rev. 123, 132 (1988).
225. Among several able attempts to define empathy as it relates to law are: Areen, supra note 23;
Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative,and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361 (1996);
Henderson, supra note 29, at 1578-87; Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling,and the Rule
ofLaw: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099 (1989); Okin, supra note 19; Ward, supra
note 220.
226. Bandes, supra note 225, at 379. Bandes quotes from the literature of psychoanalysis to
describe empathy as being primarily a value-free, mental capacity to understand the position of

A Unified Theory of Justice
something; rather, it is the rational intellectual capability and resulting
phenomenon of understanding a situation from another's vantage point.
Thus, a comment such as "I understand where you're coming from" is an
acknowledgment of the utterer's mental capacity to consider the situation
from another's perspective. To empathize is the mental process of
coming to understand another's experience "from the other person's
point of view, projecting oneself into the other's place as subject of her
experience." ' 7 Projective empathy, Cynthia V. Ward points out, is
inescapably self-focused, as one projects oneself into another's place as
subject. 28
In her article Legality and Empathy, Henderson discusses the role of
empathy as it relates to law. 29 She claims that empathetic narrative "is
part of legal discourse," and that "empathetic understanding can play a
role in legal decision making." 0 Among the cases Henderson cites to
support her thesis are Brown v. Board of Education 1 and Roe v.
Wade. 2 On the other hand, Henderson observes, legal decisions
frequently have "nothing to do with understanding human
experiences ' " or with the circumstances under which many people
actually live. 4
Henderson contends that judges and other legal decisionmakers will
be aided by gaining an empathetic understanding of the parties affected
by a given dispute.3" Possessing this mental disposition, a judge is more
likely to discover and be responsive to the possible impacts an outcome
another, including that person's emotions. Id. at 373 n.51, 380 (citing in support Michael Franz
Basch, Empathetic Understanding:A Review of the Concept and Some Theoretical Considerations,
31 J. Am. Psychoanalytic Ass'n 101, 119 (1983)).
227. Ward, supra note 220, at 934 (citing David Woodruff Smith, The Circle of Acquaintance:
Perception, Consciousness,and Empathy 112 (1989)).
228. Id.
229. Henderson, supranote 29.

230. Id. at 1649.
231. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
232. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
233. Henderson, supra note 29, at 1574. "[Ihe Court [in Roe v. Wade and in Doe v. Bolton] has
arguably failed to see the pain, despair, and stigma of women with 'unwanted' pregnancies and
'unwanted' children." Id. at 1620. "Stories can shock them [academics, judges, and lawyers] back
into sensation, into life as it is versus how we talk about it." Massaro, supranote 225, at 2105.
234. Henderson, supranote 29, at 1574-75.
235. Id. at 1576. Henderson notes that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education "came from an understanding that segregation, no matter how it is rationalized, caused
human beings pain." Id. at 1650.
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of the dispute may have on the parties' human (including emotional and
psychic) situations. In this sense, empathy can be considered an added
dimension to one's knowledge, permitting a more contextual understanding of a given situation and of the alternative responses to it. 2 6
Henderson can be read as suggesting that emotions of compassion,
sympathy, or pity should become strong factors in legal decisionmaking.
Emotional responses can be irrational and in many cases nonquantifiable. 7 But an empathetic understanding of a situation, which

takes into account the entire range of impacts a decision can affect, may,
in many instances, be a strong decisional factor."8 Henderson
demonstrates her thesis by analyzing four well-known U.S. Supreme
Court cases"o in which, she argues, the decisional processes involved the
Court's gaining or failing to gain empathetic knowledge about how the
affected parties themselves viewed their situations. In describing what
she calls the "discovery" aspects of empathy, Henderson notes the
phenomenon by which a decisionmaker learns information about others,
including knowledge of how others perceive and think about
themselves.2 "0
One can witness this discovery process at work in real-world contract
negotiations, where each side often learns about the concerns and
problems the other party faces in performing its undertakings. In
236. "Mhe ideological structures of legal discourse and cognition block affective and
phenomenological argument: The 'normal' discourse of law disallows the language and emotion of
experience." Id. at 1575. Henderson describes normal discourse about law as being "impoverished,"
lacking input of the fall range of human experience. Id. at 1574-75.
237. Empathy, Henderson notes, essentially does not consist of one's emotional response to a
situation, but rather the perception one obtains of the emotion or experience of another. Id. at 1651.
However, anger, impatience, sympathy, rectitude, hatred, and love do act as psychological stimuli.
See Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind 108-26 (Anchor Books ed., Doubleday & Co., Inc.
1963) (1930). On the other hand, some argue that emotions should have minimal influence. See, for
example, Ronald Dworkin's description of his mythical judge "Hercules" who decides cases by
rationally applying principles of integrity. Dworkin, supranote 2, at 244-66.
238. A common expression may serve to highlight Henderson's point, at least as we understand
it-the expression "how would I feel if I were you?" In commenting on empathy, Louis Wolcher has
written: "It is much easier for us to inflict an injustice on others than it is for us to inflict an injustice
on ourselves." Louis E. Wolcher, What We Do Not Doubt: A CriticalLegal Perspective,46 Hastings
L.J. 1783, 1836 (1995).
239. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
240. Henderson defines the process of empathy phenomenologically as three possible and distinct
situations: first, feeling the emotions of another, second, understanding the experience or situation of
another, both affectively and cognitively; and third, the possible action that may result by
experiencing the situation of another. Henderson, supranote 29, at 1579.
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negotiating a building contract, for example, the parties may raise
concerns about availability of needed supplies, labor, and materials,
weather factors and delays, financing and escrow arrangements, bonding
particularities, an architect's scope of duties, progress payment
schedules, change-order procedures, and so on. Given each party's
empathetic knowledge of the other's concerns and problems, negotiation
becomes a bargaining-to-consensus procedure in which the final
agreement is in part influenced and shaped by such knowledge. In this
sense, negotiation and bargaining includes the process of each party
trying to discover and understand the other party's circumstances and
then accommodating those circumstances so that, in the final bargain,
each still receives the perceived maximum attainable increase in
marginal utility. Thus, it can be concluded that empathetic knowledge
promotes the efficiency of bargained-for exchanges. Adam Smith noted
that empathy allows one person to care about what happens to other
people by imaginatively entering into their thoughts and feelings.241
Indeed, empathetic knowledge is a routine component of the process of
private autonomy for reaching efficient agreements where real
bargaining is possible. But, as demonstrated below, the role of empathy
has also been a strong component of social contract theories of justice.
C.

The Social Contract

The notion of a "social contract" in the political sense suggests that
individuals come together and agree to transfer a portion of their
individual liberties into a social arrangement that will promote their
mutual self-interest. A concept of normative political theory known as
contractarianism traces its origins at least to Cicero and the Roman
law.242 With the publication of Leviathan in 1651, Thomas Hobbes, it has
been claimed, advanced the idea of a social contract as the legitimating
foundation for social control.243 Later, John Locke, David Hume, Otto
241. Posner, Economics ofJustice,supra note 4, at 122-23 n.7 (citing Adam Smith, The Theory
ofMoral Sentiments (reprint ed. 1969) (1759), and Ronald H. Coase, Adam Smith's View ofMan, 19
J.L. & Econ. 529 (1976)).
242. According to Peter Laslett, the origins of social contract theory as well as natural law can be

found in the Roman Stoicism of Cicero and in the system of Roman law. Peter Laslett, The Social
Contract, in 7 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, supra note 41, at 467. Laslett was a Cambridge
University (Trinity College) don who authored several books on John Locke, Robert Filmer, and
social contract theory. I id. at xxxiv.
243. Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 41. Rawls, however, suggests that Hobbes may not have
advanced a true social contract deriving from a consensus. See Rawls, supranote 19, at 11 nA.
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Gierke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, among others, each produced

versions of contractarian theory.2'
The social contract has been described as the core concept of the
contractarian tradition.245 The term relates to the normative, rationally-

based tradition in political philosophy, which sets up models of social
consensus. To generalize, the social contract results from an initial
consensus reached by a collection of individuals who come together from
a "state of nature," '46 rationally agree on their society's basic institutional
arrangement, and, under certain theories, on the fundamental principles
by which the arrangement is to be conceived. The consensus necessitates
an agreement involving the transfer of a portion of each individual's
autonomous powers to a newly agreed-upon and subsequently set-up
governmental arrangement. Contractarians tend to make various
arguments, but in common they advocate the perceived wisdom of
preserving individual liberties to the fullest extent compatible with the
perceived necessity of mutual protection and self-preservation at any
cost, the latter relating to Hobbes's law of paramount necessity.247
244. See J.W. Gough, The Social Contract (2d ed. 1957); Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 42;
C.B. Macpherson, The PoliticalTheory ofPossessive Individualism:Hobbes to Locke (1962); Social
Contract:Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau (Sir Ernest Barker ed., 1948); Howard Warrender,
The PoliticalPhilosophyofHobbes: His Theory of Obligation(1957).
Otto Gierke, a German, also has been a major contributor to social contract theory. See Otto
Gierke, NaturalLaw and the Theory ofSociety 1500-1800 (Ernest Barker trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1934) (1913). Besides Immanuel Kant, another significant contractarian in the natural law
tradition is Geoffrey Russell Grice, who authored The Grounds ofMoral Judgement (1967).
245. "Social contract is the name given to a group of related and overlapping concepts and
traditions in political theory .... [I]t has at its center an extremely simple conceptual model.... that
the collectivity is an agreement between the individuals who make it up." Laslett, supranote 242, at
465.
246. The idea of "the state of nature," that is, what we are like, before the molding of our minds
and personalities through socialization, culture, and language, beneath all of our indoctrination and
education, is an idea that philosophers have considered since Protagoras, Plato, and Lucretius.
Robert C. Solomon, A Passionfor Justice: Emotions and the Origins of the Social Contract 57
(1990).
Although Thomas Hobbes characterized life in the state of nature to be "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short," a literal "war of all against all," Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 100 years later, viewed
the state of nature as one where people were naturally happy and secure. Id. at 58; see also Sir Ernest
Barker, Introduction to Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau, supra note 244, at
vii-xliv; id. at xix (contrasting Hobbsean state of nature as one in which each person does whatever
he or she pleases without regard to interest of others with Locke's view that certain natural rights,
such as to property, exist and restrain freedom of action even in apriorinatural state).
247. Hobbes wrote:
The Right of Nature,... [the] jus naturale,is the liberty each man has to use his own power, as
he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature-that is to say, of his own life-and
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Hobbes noted that societies exist in a warring state as each tries to
survive, often at the expense of others. 8
Later, Locke and then Rousseau argued that, even in the state of
nature, individuals can reason and therefore will understand the
advantage of coming together and agreeing on a mutually-protective
social arrangement. Locke and Rousseau developed the core notion of
the necessity of a rational consensus as the actualizing and legitimating

mechanism for a just society.249 In general, contractarians believe that if
society's institutions are based on a consensus of its people, the society
will be more principled and ordered than would be possible in either an
apriori state of nature or under any other societal arrangement not
predicated upon a social consensus 0°
The notion of an initial consensus as being the predicate for and the
means of deriving fundamental social principles reached its most refined
version in the writings of the American philosopher John Rawls."5
Although several prominent critics have not been persuaded by Rawls's

consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be
the aptest means thereunto."
Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 41, at 109.
248. Id. at 107. Hobbes described securing one's survival at any cost in the state of nature to be
thejus naturale, or "right of nature," in contrast to the lex naturalis,the law of nature discoverable
through reason which binds one to seek and follow peace. Id. at 109-10.
249. In discussing the "beginning of political societies," Locke commented that people by nature
are free, equal, and independent, but that "by consenting with others to make one body politic under
one government," they become obligated to everyone within that society to submit to the
determination of the majority and to be bound by such determinations. John Locke, An Essay
Concerningthe True Original,Extent and End ofCivil Government, in The Second Treatise on Civil
Government (1690), reprinted in Social Contract:Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau,supra note
244, at 3, 56-57.
250. Contractarian theories of social order are typically described in normative terms, due in part
to the theological notions of the sanctity of covenants, in part to natural law concepts of universal
obligations, in part to moral philosophy, particularly the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant,
and in part to the social significance of the institution of the promise in creating trust. David Hume,
for example, wrote that "all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled, in order to secure
mutual trust and confidence" among people in their common pursuits. David Hume, An Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals 28 (J.B. Schneewind ed., Hackett Pub. Co., 3d prtg. 1987)
(1751). Trust as the result of any promise or consensus allows us to serve each other's purposes and
to cooperate without fear of reprisal. See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of
ContractualObligation8-12 (1981). Trust is an important social norm that in turn can contribute to
efficient resolutions. See infra note 331 and accompanying text.
251. See Rawls, supra note 19; Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 27. For a partial
bibliography of Rawls's works published between 1972 and 1989 relating to his theory of justice,
see Pogge, supra note 27, at xi.
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arguments,252 and despite the confusion that has resulted from his
continuing to develop aspects of his theory, 3 the consensual mechanism
for achieving "fairness" that he has articulated remains relevant to any
attempt to integrate fairness and utility theories.
D.

The Rawlsean Model

Rawls's original version of A Theory of Justice begins with the
proposition that a society is a cooperative venture of human beings
structured for their mutual advantage.' He adds that a society is wellordered not only when it advances the "good" of its members, but also
when it is "effectively regulated by a public conception of justice." 5 A
justly organized and run society is not a matter of fiat, a declaration by
those at any moment in power, be they queens, kings, popes, presidents,
or tyrants. Rather, Rawls states, justice requires a society in which
"everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles
of justice.' 256 Universal acceptance of preordinate principles presupposes
an earlier consensus on those principles. This in turn presupposes that
members of the society possess the capability of rational thought.
Rawls describes his aim as presenting a conception of justice that
relied upon the social contract theory of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, and
advanced it to a higher level.257 What this means is that Rawls's social
contract is not just about prescribing forms of government; rather, it

252. Rawls's critics have been numerous. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia
ch. 7 (1974) (offering alternative theory of justice, "the entitlement theory"); see also J.W. Harris,
Legal Philosophies 269-70 (1980). It has been said that, unlike Rawls, Nozick has a strong
preference for liberty over equality. Heidi Li Feldman, Libertarianism with a Twist, 94 Mich.
L. Rev. 1883, 1889 (1996) (citing Thomas Nagel, Libertarianism Without Foundations,85 Yale L.J.
136, 136-38 (1975), reprintedin Thomas Nagel, Other Minds: CriticalEssays, 1969-1994, at 137,
139 (1995)).
Another critic, Richard Posner, has attacked Rawls's theory of distributive justice. See Posner,
Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at 461-63. Posner claims that Rawls's theory is compatible
with both socialism and laissez-faire capitalism. Id.
253. In A Theory ofJustice, Rawls had asserted that his thesis was part of a rational decision
theory, but in his later book, Political Liberalism, he modified his view and claimed that the
principles of justice do not result primarily from rationality, but rather from intuition. Rawls,
PoliticalLiberalism,supra note 27, at 53 n.7; see also Lake, supranote 27.
254. Rawls, supra note 19, at 4.
255. Id. at 4-5.
256. Id. at 5.
257. Id. at 11.
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focuses on deriving the principles that are used for establishing those
forms.
Significantly, Rawls added that the principles of justice would also be
necessary for regulating "all further agreements. ' Although Rawls
gave this phrase a narrow meaning, the language "all further agreements"
can be read as including all agreements derived through the private
autonomy of the people themselves, that is, all private contracts that the
governmental arrangement acknowledges as being lawful and binding.
This Article asserts that, even though Rawls did not intend to apply his
theory to the derivation of contract rights, his agreed-upon principles of
justice, in applying to all "kinds of social cooperation,"259 should also
govern private juristic relations, especially those deriving from contracts.
Rawls chose to limit his discussion and application of his thesis to the
level of abstract general principles applicable to ranking overall social
arrangements for society. In this Article, however, we apply elements of
his discourse into an ex ante model for determining private juristic
relations. But before doing so, we need to consider relevant aspects of
Rawls's theory.
1.

Assumptions RegardingRationality andIntuition

Rawls's thesis requires that members of society be capable of meeting
and reaching a consensus on the basic tenets of justice. Why do people
have the capacity to reach a consensus? Here Rawls, like Coase, must
make epistemologic assumptions regarding human beings' capacity for
rationality, as well as for intuition. Rawls's key assumption about
rationality is the standard economic notion that adult members of society
are capable of selecting and taking the most effective means to given
ends.26 A rational person, having a coherent set of preferences among
available options, will rank those options as to how well they will further
his or her purposes.2 6' Rawls expands the means-ends reasoning in his
hypothetical original position regarding taking effective means to ends,
using unified expectations based on an objective interpretation of
probability.262 Rawls argues that by means of rational reflection,
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143.

262. Id. at 146.
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participants in the original position will come to understand the
desirability of reaching a consensus on ranking principles, which would
allow them to maximize their collective preferences.263 Then, given their
ability to rationally assess alternatives, their rational and intuitive nature
will allow a ranking and consensus to be reached.2" With these
assumptions regarding human rationality and the role of intuition, Rawls
next turns to setting out the conditions necessary for reaching consensus.
2.

Conditionsfor Reaching Consensu

Arguably, Rawls's most innovative contribution to contractarian
theory is not that a just society has to be built or that principles can be
derived from a social consensus; rather, it relates to the set of conditions
he posits as necessary for any normatively-based consensus. First,
Rawls's theory requires that agreement on the principles must be made
within what he labels "the original position," the hypothetical situation
where participants (which Rawls acknowledges could be as few as one)
capable of rational reflection come together to rank and agree upon the
controlling principles.265 The conditions underlying eligibility for entry
into the hypothetical original position are critical in understanding how
the Rawlsean methodology of consensus differs from the Coasean
consensus model described in Part II above.2" Foremost among the
requirements Rawls sets out for eligibility is the requirement that
participants "not be moved by envy."267 Without envy, they would seek
to maximize social goods uninfluenced by their destructive envious
motives and feelings. This condition Rawls refers to as the "assumption
'
of mutually disinterested rationality."268
The method Rawls chose to
263. Id. at 11-12, 242-45.
264. Id. at 12.
265. Id. at 17-22.
266. See supranotes 70-87 and accompanying text.
267. Rawls, supra note 19, at 530-41; see also Jon Elster, Envy in Social Life, in Strategy and
Choice 49, 75 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) (observing that "[tihe tendency to feel a pang of
envy at another's fortune is universal"); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L.J.
1, 14 (1992) (noting that "[e]nvy creates the conventional problem of an externality or third-party

effect").
268. Rawls, supra note 19, at 144. In his later book, Political Liberalism, Rawls expands his
discussion of rationality by noting that rational agents are not limited to means-ends reasoning, but
that persons "may balance their final ends by their significance for their plan of life as a
whole ..... Nor are rational agents as such solely self-interested: that is, their interests are not
always interests in benefits to themselves." Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism, supra note 27, at 50-51.
Rawls makes a distinction between what is reasonable and what is rational. To be reasonable is to
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prevent envy from operating within the assembly was to limit each
participant's knowledge about his or her own (and others') specific
situation.2 69 Here he sets out a critical condition, which avoids not only
the influence of specialized envy, but also of greed and selfishness.
A credible criticism of the claim that people are capable of agreeing
on basic principles of justice is that each person will be influenced by his
or her own situation and, consequently, will be unwilling to agree with
the others in the group. Because presumably each person seeks to gain
and to protect those preferences that he or she most values, no
collectivity will agree on generalized principles of justice, because each
member will consider what is just situationally.
Consider this simple illustration. A rich person may rationally prefer
to have zero taxes assessed on assets so as to preserve his or her
maximum potential utility, while a poor person may rationally prefer the
government to redistribute a portion of the rich person's assets (for
example, through taxation and transfer payments) to alleviate the poor
person's impoverished situation. Consequently, the rich person is more
likely to perceive justice as a principle of liberty, which allows one to
accumulate, preserve, and use the fruits of one's total utility with little or
no governmental redistributive interferences. The poor person, however,
is more likely to perceive justice as a principle of redistribution,
requiring transfer of a portion of rich people's assets to poor people. The
poor person would consider it unfair for conditions of extreme poverty to
coexist with those of extreme wealth, a situation rectifiable through a
principle requiring redistribution.
We contend that the avoidance of such emotive influences is
necessary to overcome the bias of one's situation. More importantly,
removal of a participant's particularized situational bias is necessary to
overcome the collective pursuit of diverse self-interests, an impediment
agree to abide by norms of cooperation applicable to all, where to be rational is an individual's use
of one's powers ofjudgment and deliberation in seeking one's own ends and interests. Id. at 48-50.
Rawls also indicated that his theory ofjustice was not, as he had earlier claimed, a theory of rational
decision, but rather an intuitive one. Id. at 53 n.7.
Attacks on the assumption of rational self-maximizing choice have been numerous. One critic has
suggested that the maximizing assumption can have serious effects: "[R]eal human beings are
neither perfectly rational nor perfectly predictable.... In nonlinear systems-and the economy is
most certainly nonlinear-chaos theory tells you that the slightest uncertainty in your knowledge of
initial conditions will often grow inexorably. After a while, your predictions are nonsense."
M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity, The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos 142

(1992).
269. Rawls, supra note 19, at 136-42.
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for reaching consensus. Therefore, assuming Rawls is right about the
nature of envy, which we take as meaning that a person's situational bias
results naturally from his or her circumstances, how can any ranking or
consensus that combines both liberty and redistributive principles ever be
reached? Rawls was keenly sensitive to this problem and understood that
to reach a consensus, it would be necessary to nullify the effects of
special contingencies, which place persons "at odds and allows them to
be guided by their prejudices., 270 For Rawls, this meant finding an
answer as to how each person's situational bias can be removed from the
original position. His response was to establish, as a condition for entry
into the hypothetical assembly, a limited state of knowledge, which
would allow for rational consensus, but which would not permit the envy
of the parties or their situational biases to exert any influence.
3.

The Veil of Ignorance

Rawls's critical condition for removing the situational bias of each
participant coming into the original position is to require that each enter
under what he calls a "veil of ignorance." 27' It is assumed, Rawls states,
that the parties do not know certain facts about themselves or about the
society of which they are members. To quote Rawls:
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or
social status; ... his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like... his
conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or
even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to
risk or liability to optimism or pessimism.... [T]he parties do not
know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is,
they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of
civilization and culture it has been able to achieve... [nor to]
which generation they belong. 72
In addition, the participants would not know any other group-identifying
characteristics.27

270. Id. at 19.
271. Id. at 136-42.
272. Id. at 137.
273. Id. at 12, 137.
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On the other hand, each participant in the original position would
know certain facts about human society generally. Rawls continues:
They understand political affairs and the principles of economic
theory; ... the basis of social organization and the laws of human
psychology... whatever general facts affect the choice of the
principles of justice. There are no limitations on general
information, that is, on general laws and theories ... 274
The function of this limited veil of ignorance is that the rationality of
each person is unaffected by his or her situational bias that otherwise
would be present. Because "the differences" among the participants are
unknown to the participants, and because everyone "is equally rational
and similarly situated," each participant is convinced by "the same
arguments."275 In effect, there is no basis for the strategic bargaining that
would induce each person's efforts to reach an agreement to his or her
own advantage. No one will favor principles of justice designed to be
more responsive to one situation than another. Therefore, the principles
of justice that derive will result from a "fair agreement," untainted by
situational bias. The results of the consensus then will incorporate both
liberty and redistributive principles.
By using "fair" to describe the results of such a hypothetical
consensus, Rawls, in effect, argues that justice as fairness results only
when no party knowingly seeks an advantage at the expense of others. A
consensus so reached, not having been influenced by situational bias or
by opportunities for strategic bargaining, cannot be exploitative.
E.

The Liebeler-Alchian ex ante Model

While Rawls chose not to apply his consensus model to the derivation
of private rights and entitlements, Wesley Liebeler and Armen Alchian
laudably have done so in an important but limited fashion.276 Liebeler, a
professor of law and economics, and Alchian, a professor of economics,
have developed the parameters of a property rights system "that would
emerge from ex ante contracts made by rational persons exercising equal
liberty under zero transaction costs, knowing they would face

274. Id.at 137-38.
275. Id. at 139.
276. See Liebeler & Alchian, supranote 28 and accompanying text.
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generalized ex post specialization caused by high transaction costs."277
Relying in part on Hobbesean and Rawlsean notions, a"' and especially on
the contractarian reasoning of David Gauthier, 2 9 Liebeler and Alchian
developed an ex ante model to structure what they term "neutral baseline
2 8 These definitions will permit the common law that affects
definitions.""
and defines private juristic relations to develop so as to maximize the
preferences of every individual involved. How? First, the parties, before
contracting ex ante their property rights (assuming no transaction costs),
would need to disassociate their interests from any particular
entitlements. For example, in a nuisance situation, the parties would not
know what particular land parcels each owned. Thus, to use our earlier
example, they would not know whether they were the owner of the land
" ' As Liebeler and Alchian put
owned by the Polluter or by the Recipient.28
it, "[W]e could ask what costs each owner would agree to accept from
other nearby owners knowing ownership relations might be reversed. 282
Liebeler and Alchian's ex ante contracting model is based on the theory
of specialized assets. 28" Their contract methodology uses a variation of
the Rawlsean veil of ignorance to derive private law principles that
maximize the value of individual preferences 284 in what is claimed to be a
Pareto-superior manner.285 We now will develop our own ex ante theory
in which we incorporate into the Coase Theorem aspects of Rawls's
hypothetical consensus model as modified by the influence of the social
norms of risk aversion and fairness.
IV. A UNIFIED THEORY OF JUSTICE
The above discussions enable us to bring together various elements of
Rawlsean insights on how to achieve distributive justice and the Coase
Theorem for achieving efficiency to create a unified theory ofjustice that
277. Id. at 160.
278. Id. at 174-76.
279. See David Gauthier, Moral Dealing: Contract Ethics, and Reason 130-37 (1990); David
Gauthier, Morals by Agreement 190-230 (1986).
280. Liebeler & Alchian, supra note 28, at 188.
281. Id. at 159.
282. Id. at 180. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
283. Id. at 157 ("Assets are specialized if their value is interdependent-if the value of each
depends on what is done by or with the other .. "); see id. at 157-60.
284. Id. at 174-76.
285. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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integrates a fairness standard into the efficiency construct. Ronald Coase
and John Rawls, the former an economist and the latter a philosopher,
not only have enriched their respective disciplines, but they also have
made significant contributions to American law and jurisprudence. It
may be difficult to imagine other scholars who have had as great an
influence on jurisprudential discourse during the latter half of the
twentieth century. Yet rarely has the synthesis of their respective insights
been attempted. This Article represents such an effort. Our synthesis
culminates in the development of a unified theory and a model for
arriving at a hypothetical consensus that can be used to allocate private
law entitlements and liabilities in various private law dispute situations.
A.

Risk Aversion and "Constructive" Empathy

In discussing justice as efficiency in Part II, we implied that Coase's
suggestion that any determination of the juristic relations among private
parties or with the government can be based on a hypothetical model of
consensus resulting from costless bargaining of those relations.28 6 So,
too, Rawls's model of consensus suggests that a society's constitutional
framework and its recognition of human or fundamental rights, as well as
its principles of encouraging liberty while responding to inequalities,
results from a hypothetical model of consensus.
While the human capacity for rational empathy appears to be an
irrelevant condition under the Coase Theorem, in Rawls's model it is a
requirement. Under the veil of ignorance, the perceived necessity of
making self-maximizing or norm-comfortable choices is- what causes
each participant to agree that a "security net" must be set up. As Richard
Posner has described it, each person can foresee the possibility of
needing the net.287
Posner has further pointed out that the Rawlsean notion that
bargaining in the original position will result in "a set of arrangements
that maximize[s] the position of the worst off" depends on the
assumption that those in the original position are risk averse.28 8 Before
going further, we first discuss the social norm of risk aversion.

286. See supraPart U.A.
287. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supranote 4, at 461.
288. Id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-BasedLegal Policy, 89 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 4, 73 (1994).
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Risk has been described as measurement of "the variation of actual
outcomes from expected outcomes."289 The expected outcome is the sum
of each possible outcome multiplied by the probability of its
occurrence.2 90 For example, an investment might have a fifty percent
chance of resulting in a $100,000 return and a fifty percent chance of
yielding nothing. The investment's expected return is $50,000. Likewise,
a different investment might have a certain result of yielding $50,000.
The investment's expected return is also $50,000.291 The difference
between the two is that the first investment entails greater risk, because
there is a wider range of possibilities with respect to possible
outcomes.2 92
In theory, three responses to risk are possible. First, a person may be
risk neutral, that is, indifferent as to the risk the investment presents.293
Such a person will look only to the expected outcome of a decision. A
risk neutral person, thus, would be indifferent as between the two
investments described above. In fact, the risk neutral individual would
prefer a third choice with an expected outcome of $51,000 regardless of
whether that investment is more or less risky than the other two.
Second, a person may be risk preferring, or as some call it, risk
loving.294 A risk-preferring person is typified by an entrepreneur who
prefers the possibility of a high actual return to the certainty of a lower
actual return. Given the choice of the two investments with an expected
return of $50,000, the risk preferrer would choose the first, riskier
investment, preferring the possibility of an actual return of $100,000
rather than the certainty of an actual return of $50,000.
Finally, a person might be risk averse. All other things being equal,
the risk averse person prefers to avoid risk.2 95 A risk averse person, in
choosing between the two investments with an expected outcome of
$50,000, will choose the less risky, second choice, preferring the
certainty of a lesser return over the possibility of a higher one.
Depending on how risk averse the individual is, he or she might also
289. David N. Hyman, Economics 549 (2d ed. 1992).
290. Seidenfield, supra note 88, at 69-70.
291. Id.at 70.
292. Id.; Richard G. Lipsey et al., Economics 164 (9th ed. 1990).
293. Lipsey et al., supra note 292, at 164; see also Polinsky, supranote 4, at 51.
294. Lipsey et al., supra note 292, at 164; Seidenfield, supra note 88, at 71.
295. See Hyman, supra note 289, at 549; Lipsey et al., supra note 292, at 165; Polinsky, supra
note 4, at 53; Seidenfield, supranote 88, at 71.
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prefer the $50,000 certain return to the riskier investment with the higher
$51,000 return. 29 6 Risk aversion, in other words, is a matter of degree.
There are several reasons to expect most people to be risk averse.
First, as Richard Posner observes, "Risk aversion is a corollary of the
principle of diminishing marginal utility of money., 297 Thus, Mark
Seidenfield points out, "[F]or a poor person, another dollar may be the
difference between going hungry and eating, while for a wealthy person,
another dollar may make little real difference [in] her life." 298 Second,
certainty as to expected outcome allows people to plan for the future. 2
It is this risk aversion that leads those in Rawls's original position to
act with "constructive" empathy. If those in the original position were
risk neutral, they might create a social and economic structure that
maximizes total social utility."' Such a system would maximize expected
outcome. However, the maximum expected outcome might come from a
system that resulted in a small percentage of the population having great
wealth while the vast majority of those living in the society lived in
abject poverty.
Because a rational person in the original position would see that he or
she could be anyone, this would create two conflicting desires. First, the
rational person would want social resources to be used in the most
efficient way possible to create the highest expected outcome. At the
same time, however, this desire would be balanced by risk aversion,
creating an internal desire to narrow the range of possible outcomes.
Such anticipated risk aversion would make those in the original position
willing to settle for a somewhat lower expected possible outcome in
order to ensure that the actual outcome, their position in society, did not

296. The preferences of the risk averse can be more closely examined by looking at both positive
and negative risks. Polinsky refers to positive risk as a "beneficial risk." Polinsky, supra note 4, at
55. For example, most people prefer the certainty of a regular salary from an employer to the
possibility of making more money, but facing higher risk, working for themselves. With respect to a
beneficial risk, a risk averse person might prefer the certainty of receiving $40,000 to a 50% chance
of receiving $100,000 and a 50% chance of receiving nothing. The expected outcome of the first
possibility is $40,000, and of the second possibility is $50,000, but the risk averse person
(depending, of course, on the degree of risk averseness) will be willing to settle for less in order to
avoid risk. This happens regularly in the settlement of lawsuits.
297. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at 12; see also Charles J. Goetz, Cases and
Materialson Law andEconomics 82-84 (1984); Seidenfield, supra note 88, at 72.
298. Seidenfield, supranote 88, at 72.
299. Id. at 73.
300. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supranote 4, at 462.
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fall below a certain level. The resulting increase in expected welfare we
call the equitable gain.
The choices those in the original position would make would depend
on how risk averse they are. 30 ' Rawls suggests that this would result in a
maximin principle, that is, the highest minimum actual outcome. 30 2 This
assumes, as Posner observes, that people are "fantastically risk
averse.' 30 3 Although he does not accept the maximin result, Posner does
state that "[s]ince risk aversion affects utility, utility-maximizing social
policies will (depending on cost) include some redistributive
provisions-some social insurance or 'safety net' for people who draw
the short straws in life."3" Although the degree to which risk aversion
would affect the principles that result from the consensus may be
controversial, that risk aversion would have some effect is not.
Thus, it should be apparent that the risk aversion of those within the
veil of ignorance produces "constructive" empathy. As discussed above,
empathy can be conceptualized not as an emotion, but as a rational
mental capacity for understanding another person's situation.0 5 The veil
of ignorance produces constructive empathy because those in the original
position do not know what positions they will occupy, so, given
compliance with the social norm of risk aversion, they are forced to take
into account the interests of everyone from the worst-off to the best-off.
This response we call "constructive" empathy, because the concern is not
rooted in emotions of pity, compassion, or sympathy, but results from a
combination of rational self-maximizing and norm-satisfying accommodations. As Susan Moller Okin has observed, rational constructive
empathy means that people in the original position care about others
because they may be one of the "others."30 6 They are willing to give up
some level of potential well-being to ensure that their actual welfare does
not fall below a certain level. In short, constructive empathy is a
knowledgeable and rational self-interested response to perceived risk.

301. See Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at 462-63; Hovenkanp, supra note
288, at 73.
302. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, supra note 4, at 461.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 462.
305. See supra notes 220, 225-26 and accompanying text.
306. Okin,supra note 19, at 246.
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B.

The "FairnessEffect"

The hypothetical Coasean world of no transaction costs can tell us
what is theoretically efficient, but we do not live in that theoretically
efficient world. The society created by those in the original position can
tell us what is theoretically fair, but we do not live in that society either.
Rather, we live in the "real" world, where achieving justice depends on
crafting rules that are both fair and efficient.
That society should favor the efficiency of bargains is apparent to
many, particularly those within the law and economics discipline.
However, despite assorted normative arguments made by Fried,
Kennedy, Tribe, Rawls, Henderson, and others, it is not clear to certain
scholars that society should concern itself with the alleged fairness of
contracts." 7 Nonetheless, given that law is instrumental0 8 and that it
ought to reflect the preferences of members of society, our legal rules
must be concerned with fairness as well as efficiency. This is because the
preferences of participants in real markets are simply not the same as
those assumed by certain law and economics scholars. As we discuss
below, members of our society, market participants, are concerned not
only with the efficiency of their bargains but also with the bargains'
perceived fairness.
We can observe this fairness concern in the response of bargainers to
the division of the increase in perceived utility consequent to a bargain
(its "surplus"). As predicted by standard economic theory, parties will
not enter into a bargain unless they perceive that it will create a surplus.
However, even if a bargain creates such added utility, parties may exhibit
reluctance to enter into it if they perceive the division of the surplus to be
unfair.3" 9 Consider the following hypothetical example:

307. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Unconscionability: A CriticalReappraisal, 18 J.L. & Econ. 293
(1975).
308. See supranote 2.
309. See Sunstein, Social Norms, supranote 9, at 944. Sunstein explains this phenomenon:
When two people are to divide an amount given them ... the offeror... feels shame given
prevailing norms-that he is demonstrating that he is a greedy and even horrible person-if he
offers a penny or a dollar from a sum of (say) $200.... For his part, the offeree feels
mistreated-treated in a contemptuous way-if a small or token amount is suggested. The social
meaning of the statement, "How about five cents for you?" is contempt; the social meaning of
responding, "Great!" is a willingness to be dishonored.

Id.(citations omitted).
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Harry owns a piece of vacant land on which he has thoughts of
building a house in the future. Because of this planned use, the land is
worth $10,000 to him. He is approached by Leah, who offers to buy the
land for $12,000. Harry finds out that Leah is planning to build a factory
on the land, and that because the land is particularly suited for the type of
factory she wishes to build, the land is worth $140,000 to her. Only Leah
has the knowledge and resources to build this type of factory. Harry turns
down Leah's offer; he would rather hold on to the land than get "ripped
off," he tells her.
Harry's response may not be "rational." If the land is worth $10,000 to
him, then he is better off if he accepts an offer to buy it for $12,000,
regardless of whether it is worth $14,000 or $140,000 to Leah.
Nonetheless, the "fairness effect" accords with the way participants in
real markets often make decisions." '
Although the existence of the fairness effect may seem intuitively
obvious to non-economists, it has also been empirically demonstrated.
Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer conducted a series of laboratory
experiments designed to test the validity of assumptions underlying the
Coase Theorem. In the first of these experiments, one or two parties out
of two-person and three-person groups had to choose from a selection of
numbers.3"' Each of the numbers represented different payoffs to each
person; the number that represented the highest total payoff to both
parties was not the same as the one that represented the highest payoff to
one party if there was no exchange.3" 2 In all of the situations, one party
made the decisions, side payments were allowed, and the contracts were
310. See Buckley, supra note 9, at 54. Buckley states:
Fairness norms may be strongly felt, with bargainers willing to bear a personal loss to punish
another party for unfairness. In ultimatum games, for example, one party (the "controller')
divides up a fixed amount of money and the other must accept or reject his share. If he rejects it,
neither party receives anything. Although it might seem rational for the second player to accept
any offer, a substantial portion of such parties are willing to reject unequal, positive offers.
lt (citing Selten, The Equity Principlein EconomicBehavior, in Decision Theory and Social Ethics,
Issues in Social Choice 289 (H. Gottinger & w. Leinfeller eds., 1978), and Kahneman et al.,
Fairnessand the Assumptions ofEconomics, 59 J. Bus. S285 (1986)).
Psychologist Robert Frank makes an interesting point regarding a person who is perceived by
others as disliking unfair bargains: "[A] person who is known to 'dislike' an unfair bargain can
credibly threaten to walk away from one, even when it is in her narrow interest to accept it. By virtue
of being known to have this preference she becomes a more effective negotiator." Robert H. Frank,
Passions Within Reasons: The Strategic Role ofthe Emotions 5 (1988).
311. Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem, supra note 9, at 84.
312. Id.
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written and strictly enforced." 3 In certain situations, the parties knew
what the payoffs were to be to the other party from each decision, while
in others the parties were not given that information but were allowed to
share it if they chose." 4 In addition, certain parties had to reach two sets
of agreements, but did not know while reaching the first who would be
the decisionmaker in the second." 5
As Hoffman and Spitzer expected, in approximately ninety percent of
the 114 decisions, the parties chose the number that maximized total
payoffs, that is, the "efficient" number.3" 6 More surprising to them,
however, was that sixty-seven of the 114 groups then divided the total
payoff evenly or close to evenly." 7 This meant that, in many cases,
parties knowingly chose an allocation of the payout that left them with a
lower marginal return than they would have received had they chosen the
result that maximized their individual payouts. Hoffman and Spitzer
explained that if the decisionmaker can choose between an outcome that
gives the decisionmaker twelve dollars and the other party zero dollars,
or another outcome that produces a total payout of fourteen dollars for
the two parties, "[u]nder no circumstances should the [decisionmaker]
settle for less than $12.238 In contrast to this prediction, however, many
of the parties divided such a payout with seven dollars to each party.3" 9

313. Id. at 82-91.
314. Id.
315. Id.at 86.
316. Id. at 91. Almost all of the groups that did not reach the efficient decision were three-person
groups in which there were two decisionmakers and in which the parties were not given information
about the payoffs to the other parties. Id.
317. Id. at93.
318. Hoffman & Spitzer, An ExperimentalExamination, supranote 9, at 259.
319. Id.at 260. In an experiment that followed their original article, Hoffman and Spitzer tried to
determine what caused this unexpected result. Id. at 260-61. They used essentially the same set-up
as in their first experiment, except that they used only two-person groups, and they determined
which party would be the decisionmaker in some cases with a coin flip and in other cases by picking
the party who won a simple skill game. Id. In half of each of these cases, the groups were told that
the decisionmaker had "earned" the position, and the others were told that the decisionmaker was
"designated." Id. at 267-72.
Again, about 90% of the groups chose the number that maximized the group's total payout. Id. at
275. Hoffman and Spitzer found that both the way in which the controlling party is picked and what
label is put on that decision made a significant difference in the outcome. Id. at 280. In the groups
that picked a decisionmaker by a game and were told that the position was earned, 68% of the time
the decisionmaker received "at least his individual maximum." Id. at 275. Of the groups told instead
that the position of decisionmaker was designated, 61% divided the payout evenly between the
parties, leaving the decisionmaker with a less-than-optimal total payout. Id.
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Other scholars have conducted experiments with what economists call
the "ultimatum game. 3 2' The rules of this game are as follows:
The people who run the game give some money, on a provisional
basis, to the first of two players. The first player is told to offer
some part of the money to the second player. If the second player
accepts that amount, he can keep what is offered, and the first
player gets to keep the rest. But if the second player rejects the
offer, neither party gets anything. Both [parties] are informed that
"'
these are the rules. No bargaining is allowed.32
If economists' assumptions of rationality were correct, "the first
player should offer a penny and the second player should accept. 3 22 In
actuality, however, offers are normally between thirty and forty percent
of the total and are sometimes fifty percent, while offers of less than
twenty percent are often rejected. 3"
F.H.Buckley identifies several factors that help explain the reluctance
of participants in real-as opposed to theoretical-markets to enter into
contracts that are perceived to be substantively unfair.324 First, unlike
theoretical negotiations in the neoclassical economic model, transactions
in actual marketplaces are costly in time and resources, especially in
gaining relevant information. Bargains that would make both parties
better off will not be reached if the transaction costs of reaching those
bargains are too high. The norm of fairness in bargaining "reduce[s] the
probability of a bargaining breakdown by providing a focal point for
' Not having this focal
agreement."325
point, a breakdown in bargaining
may occur because of a problem referred to as "the Negotiator's
Dilemma."326 Bargainers wish to acquire as much of the surplus as
possible, but "a claim for disproportionate individual gains may result in
'
a breakdown of negotiations and a loss of joint gains."327
Cooperation in
bargaining may prevent this problem:

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Sunstein, Social Nonns, supranote 9, at 904.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 904-05.
See Buckley, supranote 9, at 48-59.

325. Id. at 48.
326. Id.at 49 n.63 (quoting D. Lax & J. Sebenius, The Manageras Negotiator: Bargainingfor
Cooperationand Competitive Gain 38 (1986)).
327. Id.at 48-49.
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In any society, the level of bargaining will depend on the
prevalence of norms of cooperation. Amongst a group of
unconstrained maximizers, the pursuit of individual gains will
reduce the number of agreements which are concluded. In a less
grasping society, by contrast, habits of compromise will encourage
the formation of contracts. The first society will then be poorer than
the second. 28
Thus, by providing a starting or focal point for bargaining, the normative
expectation that the surplus from a bargain will be divided fairly can
reduce bargaining costs, thereby leading to greater efficiency.
Second, there are costs to consumers in reading and understanding the
terms of standard form contracts.329 If these costs are sufficiently high,
consumers are presented with a choice between either not entering into
agreements or entering into agreements they do not fully understand. If
consumers enter into bargains without full information, "[t]erms which
would be efficiently specified if all consumers were to screen [the
agreements] might... be abandoned for terms which inefficiently favor
the merchant., 33' Rather than take this risk, consumers might choose not
to enter into the agreement at all. Consequently, when the participants in
a market trust that they will be dealt with fairly, they will more likely
enter into agreements; when market participants fear that they will be
treated unfairly, they will be reluctant to enter into agreementsincluding those that might otherwise be rational and efficient from an
economic perspective. A norm of substantive fairness in contracting thus
encourages a greater level of contracting by reducing the risk that an
unread standard form contract will be one-sided.
Other economists have demonstrated that a social norm of trust
increases the level of bargaining and thereby improves efficiency. 33 '
Likewise, a social norm of fairness in the distribution of the surplus
created by a bargain will encourage parties to enter into bargains that are
efficient, but which they might be reluctant to enter into if they fear
being treated unfairly.

328. Id.at 49.
329. Id. at 59-60.
330. Id. at 62.
331. See Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995);
Russell Hardin, Trusting Persons,Trusting Institutions, in Strategy and Choice 185-209 (Richard J.
Zeckhauser ed., 1991).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 73:249, 1998

Whether the reasons set forth by Buckley and others are the best
explanation for the fairness effect or not, that effect does exist.
Consequently, a realistic model for justice must be concerned about both
the efficiency and distributive fairness of agreements. Not only are
fairness and efficiency important goals in and of themselves, but, in the
real world, they are interdependent. This leaves us with the question of
how, without sacrificing the efficiency goal, we can assure that the terms
of contracts are substantively fair.
C.

Integratingthe Condition ofHidden Identity into the Coase Theorem

We can integrate fairness into efficiency by introducing one of
Rawls's tools into the Coase Theorem. By modifying Rawls's veil of
ignorance and introducing it into Coase's model, we can create a
theoretical consensus construct that allows us to ensure that a particular
bargain is both fair and efficient. To put it simply, assume that Rawls and
Coase have separately developed games for reaching consensus. For both
games, the game-master has developed rules or conditions for entry.
Rawls's version of the game demands that the players know nothing
about themselves, that the veil of ignorance as to their own situation be
complete so as to prevent any possibility of bargaining for their own
advantage at the expense of the group. The object of the game is to reach
a consensus that will maximize the well-being of each of the parties
while minimizing the risk to each.
Coase, on the other hand, demands that players come to his bargaining
game with full knowledge of who they are and what they want, besides
knowing all relevant facts about each and every one of the other players.
The object of this game is to reach a final consensus on a set of trade-offs
by which each party attains a net increase in value.
In Coase's game, each party's situational bias and observance of
perceived norms drive the game. Thus, the parties are free to pursue their
particularized self-interests, using their situations and social knowledge
to their advantage. This allows a strong party at the table to bargain or to
draft to the max,332 including inserting into a form "agreement" remedial
provisions that, for example, would give that party every possible right
332. Drafting to the max occurs when a party having grossly superior bargaining power uses that
power to exact an agreement that limits, to the extent the law permits, the stronger party's own
liabilities under the "agreement" while maximizing its legal rights should the weaker party default,
and where, in addition, the events of default are defined unilaterally by the stronger party.
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to preserve and protect its initially gained increase in utility in the event
of the other party's default, while limiting its own liability in the event of
its own default.333
In contrast, in Rawls's original position, the game is driven in part by
uncertainty as to the implications of any consensus reached among the
parties. Rawls avoids the problem of situational bias by preventing the
parties from knowing which terms of the consensus would situationally
benefit them. The risk aversion of the parties under Rawls's veil of
ignorance produces a more even distribution of the surplus utility that
will be generated.
Recall that Rawls's moral philosophy focuses his consensus model on
deriving "just" principles for organizing and administering a "wellordered" society, while the Coasean consensus model focuses more on
the resolution of issues of legal entitlements, especially in areas of
private law-torts, property, and contracts. Despite the dissimilarity of
focus, we propose to use a Rawlsean tool to modify the Coase Theorem,
thereby creating a method for the analysis of private law issues that
tempers efficiency with fairness and acknowledges social norms
producing a "fairness effect," which in turn weakens the assumption of
pervasive self-maximizing behavior. A Rawlsean tool for achieving
fairness can be integrated into the Coasean model for two reasons. First,
each model depends upon a similar methodological concept to reach its
goals: a hypothetical consensus. Second, both Coase and Rawls (Rawls
to a lesser degree) assume the participants will be rationally self-seeking
in reaching consensus.334
The solution we propose is to modify Rawls's "veil of ignorance" into
what we term the "condition of hidden identity," and then insert that
condition into the Coase Theorem. The condition of hidden identity
assumes that each affected person has full knowledge of each party's
age, race, sex, status, and social and economic condition, in contrast to

333. Consider, for example, a contract for the sale of goods, in which the seller uses a dragnet,
cross-collateral clause along with a disclaimer of all warranties provision.
334. This is an assumption somewhat at odds with modem construction theory concerning social
norms and meanings. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text. An awareness of social norms
that impede efficient bargains is important, particularly to highlight classes of bargaining that might
be made more efficient and/or more fair by emulation of the bargain that would be reached under the
unified model. However, the assumption is crucial to ensuring that the hypothetical bargain the
parties reach will be efficient. To modify this assumption to reflect the social norms that affect
people's willingness to enter into bargains would both complicate the model enormously and prevent
it from resulting in all efficient bargains being reached.
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the more limited knowledge assumptions under the veil of ignorance. But
unlike Rawls's more comprehensive veil of ignorance, the condition of
hidden identity assumes only that any party operating under it does not
know which party to the bargain he or she will be.
In short, our "hybrid" model retains all of the assumptions of the
Coase model, save one: the assumption that the players have perfect
knowledge. Rather, the parties seeking consensus will have the complete
knowledge Coase assumes, except that they will operate under the
condition of hidden identity. For example, in a pollution controversy,
the parties would not know if they were the Polluter or the Recipient, but
they would know all of the costs and benefits to each party for each
possible alternative resolution of the dispute. Under our proposed unified
theory of justice, the rules of Coase's game would thus change so that
each player would come to the table knowing not only everything
relevant about each other player, but also knowing the social norms and
meanings that will influence each player, including norms of risk
aversion and perceived fairness; but no player would know which party
he or she would be.
Will the results of this new game be efficient? If the parties could
reach an agreement under the traditional rules of the Coasean game, they
could reach one under the rules of the hybrid one. In either case, the
parties would enter into an agreement only if they perceive it to increase
the welfare of each of the parties at least marginally.
Although the insertion of the condition of hidden identity would in
most instances not affect whether players in the hybrid model would
reach a consensus, it would in certain situations affect the terms of that
consensus. Just as the veil of ignorance negates the effect of situational
bias in the original position, the condition of hidden identity negates the
effect of gross disparities in bargaining power existing in imperfectly
competitive markets. When great disparities in bargaining power do not
exist, the consensus reached would likely be the same or similar as if the
parties had known their identities. In other cases, however, the pursuit of
self-interest will be tempered by the risk-aversion norms of the parties.
Being influenced by the norm of risk aversion, the players will not want
to insert terms into the agreement that are not essential for reaching
consensus but that are one-sided or exploitative, since they will not know
on which side of the agreement they will be. With this precautionary
mind-set, they will agree to allocate the expected surplus in a manner
considered "fair" for both parties.
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D. Applications: Examples
The Coasean-Rawlsean model described above can be applied to a
wide range of situations that have presented problems for the law. These
include doctrinally troublesome areas such as: how to establish fairness
in contracts alleged to be adhesive or unconscionable; under what
circumstances gratuitous promises made in response to benefits the
promisor previously received from the promisee should be enforced;
under what circumstances should courts construct implied-in-law
contracts, also called quasi-contracts, to remedy problems of unjust
enrichment; under what circumstances should gratuitous promises that
induce injurious reliance by promisees be enforced; when is it
appropriate for courts to consider non-economic values, such as
esthetics, in contract disputes; and how courts should resolve legal
liabilities and entitlements in traditional nuisance situations.
The authors are concurrently exploring these and other topics for a
forthcoming article; for now, we offer a few situations where our
hypothetical model would be of practical assistance to courts in resolving
a wide range of disputes. We leave a more detailed analysis for later
publication.
1.

Fairnessof the Exchange: Unconscionability

Recall the case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,33
involving a retailer's use of a cross-collateral, pro-rata payment clause in
a consumer credit transaction. Following the consumer's default, the
retailer asserted a right to repossess items sold to the consumer years
earlier, items she thought she had paid for.336 On the one hand, the
intuitive "justice-as-fairness" response to the facts of this case is typified
by the comments of Arthur Leff, who stated, "For those of us who have
an instinctive and infallible sense of justice (and which of us does not),
any other result [than the presumption of unconscionability] in this case
is unimaginable."33' 7 Under a pure fairness approach, the cross-collateral
clause would not be enforced at all; Walker-Thomas would have no
security-interest recourse against Williams.

335. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

336. Id at 447.
337. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev.
485,552 (1967).
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There are several problems with this approach. First, on what criteria
is a judge to determine which contract provisions are unconscionable?
Even Leff had difficulty in identifying exactly what it was that made the
transaction seem instinctively unjust. Was it that the consumer was
unaware of the clause or, even had it been pointed out to her, how it
operated? Was it the combination of cross-collateral and pro-rata
payment clauses? Was it that the consumer did not need, in the eyes of
some perhaps, the stereo: that is, was it because the seller had knowingly
sold her a frill (as the lower court patemalistically suggested)?33 8 Or was
it because she was unaware of the clause's potential effect when signing
the agreement and was subsequently "surprised" when told that the
retailer could repossess all the items he had previously sold to her?
Intuition alone does not isolate the factors.
On the other hand, there may be good reasons for enforcing crosscollateral clauses in consumer contracts. A retailer may perceive the need
for collateral as a condition for extending credit in selling goods to
protect an expected utility gain. Thus, a legitimate commercial purpose
exists for allowing cross-collateral clauses. Richard Epstein has argued
that these clauses aid buyers as much as sellers, because their use allows
buyers in many instances to acquire goods or services that, but for the
seller's security interest in the buyer's property, the buyers would not
have been able to purchase.339 Thus, any reaction to Walker-Thomas that
would outright ban the use of such clauses in consumer credit sales
would likely produce a net loss in welfare. Nonetheless, the Federal
Trade Commission has imposed such a ban.34 °
Consequently, a pure "justice-as-faimess" response of banning crosscollateral clauses in consumer credit contracts arguably hurts those it is
intended to protect-consumers in need of credit. It may be that for
every person in Williams's situation who is prevented from becoming
overextended, defaulting, and losing everything, many other consumers
are being prevented from obtaining net increases in utility that they
otherwise could have obtained.
But on the other hand, the argument made by Epstein, that add-on or
cross-collateral clauses ought to be enforced because they are efficient,
338. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964).
339. See Epstein, supra note 307, at 307 (observing that "[t]he 'add-on' [cross collateral] clause
allows both parties to benefit from the reduction in costs in the setting up of a security
arrangement"); see id. at 306-08.
340. See 16 C.F.R § 444.2(a)(3) (1997).
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does not respond to the intuitive sense of injustice Leff and so many
others have felt in reacting to the particular facts of the Walker-Thomas
case. A better explanation of this sense of injustice may be the social
perception that the "surplus" is too one-sided, considering that Williams
was never allowed to pay off completely any of her prior purchases due
to the pro-rata payment allocation provision included in the crosscollateral clause.
Our unified model, in contrast, allows for the consideration of both the
fairness and the efficiency aspects of such an agreement. Our model asks,
is this agreement in the form that the parties would both be willing to
enter into assuming a costless bargaining setting where they understood
all trade-offs, but where neither knew which party he or she would be
(the condition of hidden identity)? That is, how would constructive
empathy change the shape of the bargain that the parties would reach?
We tentatively suggest that the retail installment sales contract would
still include a cross-collateral clause, but with no pro-rata payment
allocation characteristic. It would be understood that when the purchase
price of any item previously purchased had been paid as well as the
outstanding interest on that amount, the seller's security interest in that
item would cease and the purchaser would own the item free and clear.
2.

GratuitousPromisesfor Benefits PreviouslyReceived

In the case of Mills v. Wyman,341 the Massachusetts Supreme Court
held that the promise of a father to pay the final expenses of care to his
deceased son's caretaker was not enforceable because the promise lacked
consideration. 342 The facts of Mills fall within that group of cases in
which a promisor makes a gratuitous promise, often in gratitude or
appreciation for benefits previously received from the promisee, benefits
that themselves were given gratuitously. 43 The Mills court commented
that the father who made the promise was morally, but not legally,
obligated to perform, holding that there was no actual bargained-for
consideration for the promise.
If the Coase theorem were applied to Mills, the result would be the
same. Why? Because the promisor would not have agreed to be obligated
341. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).
342. Id. at 208-09.
343. Id at209.
344. Id.
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to give anything in exchange for a service that, when given by the
promisee, the promisor knew would be offered gratuitously. In other
words, the most efficient allocation of the parties' rights would not make
the promisor, the father, liable for breaching his promise, since he would
not have agreed ex ante to be liable knowing the promisee would demand
nothing in exchange. Although efficient, the result was nonetheless felt
by the Mills court to be unfair.
In contrast, under our model, a court would hold that the father's
promise was enforceable. Since the promisor and the promisee would
know everything that would transpire in the situation except their
respective identities, each party ex ante would agree that the promise be
enforceable, since either could end up being the promisee (who would
benefit from enforcement of the promise) and since the promisor (again
potentially either party) would still receive the benefit of knowing his
dying son was cared for in his last illness. Enforcement of the promise to
pay for the caretaking services would still be an efficient transaction,
both parties voluntarily choosing to enter into it, but now it would also
represent a fair division of the benefits created-the caretaking of the
dying son, the gratitude for that care by the father, and the enforcement
of the promise to pay money in recognition of those benefits. In other
words, to enforce the promise produces an equitable gain in net benefits,
and thus the solution would be both efficient and fair.
Another example of a promise to pay for benefits previously received
that would be enforceable under our Coasean-Rawlsean model is the
1935 case of Webb v. McGowin.34 5 There, a worker in a lumber yard was
cleaning an upper floor in a millhouse and was starting to drop a large
block of wood to the ground when he saw that his employer was directly
beneath him. The employee held on to the block to divert its direction,
and, in doing so, fell to the ground below, preventing death or serious
injury to his employer, but at the cost of sustaining serious bodily
injuries himself that crippled him for life. 46 Later, the employer, in
genuine gratitude, promised to pay his injured employee fifteen dollars
every two weeks for the rest of the employee's life. After the employer
died, his estate refused to make subsequent payments. 47
The court held that the promise to pay was one for consideration,
given the materiality of the benefit the promisor had received from the
345. 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935).
346. Id at 196-97.
347. Id
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previous action of the promisee."' The court's decision to enforce the
promise may have been admirable, but its rationale was a distortion of
the bargain-for-exchange concept underlying the doctrine of
consideration. There was no bargain, as the employer's promise was
gratuitous, having been based on the employee's previously-rendered
gratuitous (albeit potentially life-saving) act.
If the Coase theorem were applied, and we were to ask what the
promisor would have agreed to if, ex ante, he knew what might result,
the promise still would not be enforceable. The promisor, with perfect
knowledge of what actions the promisee would take, would know that
the promisee would demand nothing in exchange for his gratuitous
action. Therefore, no bargain would be necessary to attain the desired
result, and there would be no right on the part of this injured employee to
any later-promised compensation from his employer, this being the
efficient resolution.
If a court were to apply our model, however, meaning that neither
party would know if he or she were the promisor or the promisee, a
different rationale of fairness for enforcing the promise would result.
Since each party could foresee being the injured-for-life promisee, each
would want the promisor to be legally obligated to keep his promise and
would so agree in a hypothetical contract.
Today, the Mills and Webb cases would come under the amorphous
principle of section 86 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
states that promises based on benefits previously received by the
promisor from the promisee should be enforceable to the extent
necessary to prevent injustice.349 How is a court to decide if such a
promise ought to be enforced? What does the prevention of injustice
involve? Application of our model provides the answer.
3.

Quasi-Contracts

Similar to situations involving promises for benefits previously
received are instances in which someone receives a benefit and later a
court creates or constructs a fictitious contract between the benefit-giver
and the benefit-recipient, although no actual contract existed nor were
promises made-a sub-area known as "quasi-contracts," which comes

348. Itt at 198.
349. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86 (1979).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 73:249, 1998

within the legal category referred to as restitution" An example of a
" ' where
case of this type is Cotnam v. Wisdom,35
the court constructed a
quasi-contract (sometimes called either a constructive or an implied-inlaw contract) between a person left unconscious by a street car accident
and the physicians who furnished emergency medical services. The
physicians were unsuccessful in saving the victim's life and later sued
the victim's estate for the value of the services rendered.352 The court
recognized that a fictitious contract was necessary to "afford
a
' although doing so was admittedly "not good logic. 354
remedy,"353
Under our model, the parties ex ante would have agreed, under a
hypothetical contract, to create a duty to pay for the services, the duty
being allocated to the one who received help. Either party could be the
one in need of emergency. medical services and, therefore, would want to
encourage their rendition.
4.

GratuitousPromisesInducing Reliance

Gratuitous promises that induce foreseeable injurious reliance on the
part of promisees would also be enforceable under our thesis.3 55 Socalled promissory estoppel, where courts enforce gratuitous promises to
'
the extent that "injustice can be avoided,"356
can be explained as an
attempt by courts to allocate private rights and liabilities fairly in nonbargained-for promissory situations where one party has relied to his or
her detriment on a promise. Again, if the parties did not know which
party they would be-the promisor whose promise foreseeably would
induce the detrimental reliance, or the promisee who would so relythen a hypothetical Coasean-Rawlsean contract would answer the

350. '"Quasi contract' is a useful term for describing a ground for recovering money in an action
at common law, when the claim is not based either on principles of tort law or on a true contract but
instead seeks redress for unjust enrichment." E. Allan Farnsworth & William F. Young, Cases and
Materialson Contracts77 n.c (5th ed. 1995).
351. 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907).
352. Id. at 165.
353. Id. at 166.
354. Id.
355. This scenario will be analyzed more fully in a subsequent article.
356. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding ifinjustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 90 (1979) (emphasis added).
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questions of whether the promisor should be liable, and, if so, to what
extent.
5. JudicialConsiderationof Non-Economic Values
3 7
In Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.,
1 the Oklahoma

Supreme Court described a contract between a strip mining firm
(Garland) and landowners (the Peevyhouses), which allowed Garland to
strip mine the Peevyhouse farm for five years and then to perform
restorative and remedial work, as a contract "merely to accomplish the
economical recovery and marketing of coal from the premises, to the
35 Consequently,
profit of all parties.""
even though the mining company
had intentionally breached its contract by not restoring the land as
promised, the court, by a five-to-four margin, allowed the farm owners to
recover only $300 in damages, the so-called diminution-in-value
measure,35 9 rather than the $25,000 asked for by the Peevyhouses, an
amount that would have approximated the cost of completion of the
restoration. Why? Because, the court reasoned, the resale value of the
Peevyhouse farmland had only been reduced by $300; thus, it would be
economic waste to require the strip miner to restore the land as
promised. 6 °
The majority opinion of the court evidenced no empathy with the
landowners' situation, although the Peevyhouses valued the restored
appearance of their land as much as Garland valued the right to strip the
coal from it. How do we know? Because this was the actual contract
agreed to; the restorative obligations were part of the bargain. Had the
court considered the contract not only as one for economically retrieving
coal, but also as one requiring the restoration of the esthetics of the
landowners' property-had it been able to stand in the shoes of both
parties-it would have seen that a fair division of the net increase in
equity produced by the contract required that it be enforced so as to
demand cost of completion damages under these circumstances.

357. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
358. Id. at 112.
359. The diminution in value in this case was calculated as the difference in value between the
property before the mining had taken place and the value of the land after the mining had been
completed. Id. at 114.
360. Id. at 112-14.
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Nuisance Law

36
Finally, the circumstances of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.
provide an example of a dispute in which the result using the Coasean
model or applying the unified theory model would be the same, but
would differ from the older, traditional resolution under nuisance law
principles. Boomer involved a cement plant near Albany, New York,
whose operation involved the discharge of large quantities of dust and
excessive vibration from blasting.362 The cement factory had cost more
than $45 million to build and employed more than 300 people. 363 The
effects of the pollution diminished the value of the neighbors' property
3
by approximately $185,000. 1
The traditional resolution of such nuisance suits in New York was a
property rule, an entitlement protecting landowners' rights to quiet use
and enjoyment of their property. Under this traditional analysis, the
"cause" of the landowners' harm in the Boomer case was the factory; the
court focused on the fact that the harm "caused" by the factory interfered
with the property owners' quiet use and enjoyment. Since the factory's
operation was found to be a nuisance interfering with these property
rights, it would have to be shut down, and an injunction would be
issued.365 Under the traditional analysis, this would be the result even if
the harm (disutility) caused by the nuisance was much less than the net
social utility created by the factory.
While it may appeal to a particular sense of fairness to say that if a
factory is causing its neighbors harm, it ought to be shut down, this
"resolution" has two problems. First, as Coase pointed out in The
Problem of Social Cost, it oversimplifies the problem to state that an
externality cost is "caused" by one party or another.366 One could just as
easily say that the landowners "caused" the problem by living close to
the factory. Second, and more importantly, the property owners'
entitlement rule ignores the loss of the social utility that results from

361. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
362. Id. at 871.
363. Id. at 873 n.*.
364. Id. at 873.
365. See, for example, Whalen v. Union Bag & PaperCo., 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913), where the
court reinstated an injunction against a pulp mill's operation in favor of a downstream riparian owner
when the mill cost in excess of one million dollars and the riparian owner's economic loss was

"small." Id. at 805.
366. Coase, Social Cost, supranote 4.
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shutting down the factory. In the Boomer situation, the transaction costs
for the parties themselves to reach a private resolution of this dispute
would likely be so high as to negate any private consensus. If the
landowners were unable to come to an agreement with the factory
because of prohibitively high transaction costs, under the traditional
approach the factory would have been shut down. Doing so would mean
losing a factory that increased social welfare by $45 million while
preventing a harm to landowners that the court found to be about
$185,000.367
Rather than permit this outcome, the court in effect used a justice-asefficiency approach, arguably imposing on the parties the agreement that
3 68
would have resulted had the parties been able to bargain costlessly.
The court imposed a liability rather than an entitlement rule, allowing the
factory to continue its operations, but requiring it to pay provable
damages to the landowners. This result compensated the landowners for
their losses, but allowed the factory to remain open, a resolution that
clearly promoted efficiency and wealth maximization.
In this instance, applying our Coasean-Rawlsean model would
produce the same result as the court reached, consistent with the Coase
Theorem. The parties would know that reaching an agreement would
increase their net welfare; and while the landowners would have no
alternative but to deal with the factory to resolve the pollution problem,
likewise the factory would have no other alternative than dealing with
the homeowners. Thus, it would be important to both parties to reach a
consensus. Operating under the condition of hidden identity, the parties
would realize that they could be the factory owners, and therefore they
would want to ensure that the factory could continue to operate
profitably. The parties would also realize that they could be the property
owners, and they thus would want to ensure that they would receive
adequate compensation for the injuries they suffered from the factory's
pollution.
The above examples illustrate a few areas where a combined CoaseanRawlsean ex ante hypothetical consensus model can be used, not only to
explain the soundness of many decisions, but also to assist courts in
deciding those issues where "justice" and "fairness" are included within
the decisional criteria. Ongoing research and analysis will, we believe,

367. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873 n.*.
368. Md.at 874-75 (awarding what court called "permanent damages" to landowners).
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reveal other areas where the model is workable and will provide further
assurance that dispute settlement can be both efficient and fair.
V.

CONCLUSION

Where perfect competition exists, the terms of any allocation of
entitlements and liabilities will be set solely by the marketplace,369 and
the relative bargaining power of individual parties will have no
discernible effect. Consequently, our model need not be applied in every
circumstance. Unlike the Coase Theorem, our model relies on a weak
version of the assumption that the parties to a bargain always act
rationally. Our model acknowledges that people make behavioral
decisions partially in response to social norms.37 Also, as in Rawls's
hypothetical original position, the results under our unified model
depend in part on the assumptions one makes about the degree to which
people are risk averse or risk neutral. We recognize that if lawmakers and
judges applied our hybrid model to every dispute, the overall result
might be a smaller gain in total social utility. Still, in general, the best
test ex post of whether a bargain is fair and efficient is still whether
ex ante the parties entered into the agreement willingly.
More importantly, our model is useful as a methodology for
perceiving private law-making in a way that permits weight to be given
to considerations of both fairness and efficiency. We believe the model
may be especially useful in the examination of private agreements that
raise fairness concerns where disparities exist in the bargaining power of
the parties.3"7' Thus, our model may be helpful for a court in considering
369. See Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 746-47 (arguing that terms of contract made under
conditions of perfect competition have strong claim to both fairness and efficiency).
370. See supranotes 309-20 and accompanying text.
371. Such as in "contracts of rescue," for example, as described by Buckley, who provides the
following example:
Anthony is an adventurous millionaire, whose travels have taken him to a remote desert. There
his car breaks down, and he finds himself alone and very hungry. After a few days of wandering
on foot, he comes across Conrad, a mercenary innkeeper. After questioning Anthony about his
wealth, Conrad agrees to give Anthony food and lodging, and to help him return to civilization.
In return, he demands all of Anthony's wealth. "Think about it for a few days," he tells
Anthony.
Buckley, supra note 9, at 41.
For a discussion of such "contracts of rescue" from an economic perspective, see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study ofLaw andAltruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1978).
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claims of unconscionability. In such cases, our unified model might not
only temper efficiency with fairness, but also fairness with efficiency.
Moreover, our model, as demonstrated above, has the capability of
resolving a wide range of situations, including nuisance cases,
condemnations, gratuitous promises, detrimental reliance, and restitution.
In summary, the modified Coasean model we propose retains as the
normative principle the efficient maximization of total social welfare.
But within our consensus model is included a modified Rawlsean
redistributive principle. The redistribution results from constructive
empathy that, depending on the circumstances, produces a social output
at some point between the Posnerean "maximized total utility 37 2 and
what has been labeled the Rawlsean "maximin."373 Whatever that output
might be, we call it the "equitable gain" to distinguish it from either the
maximin or the maximum result.
This equitable gain is predicated upon the interaction of three factors.
First, legal rights, liabilities, and entitlements will be allocated in a
manner designed to promote Pareto efficiency. Second, the most Paretoefficient response in certain situations will be modified by the operation
of constructive empathy resulting from the condition of hidden identity
inserted into the Coasean model. The resulting constructive empathy will
cause the otherwise Pareto-efficient result to be modified by a more
equitable division of the surplus created by the bargain. Third, further
compromises with efficiency maximization may result consequent to the
social norm of perceived fairness in dividing the surplus utility. In short,
our unified theory of justice is intended to accommodate and incorporate
the normative ends of both efficiency and fairness.
The integrated model we propose is achievable through the insertion
of a modified Rawlsean condition of hidden identity into the hypothetical
Coasean efficiency paradigm. The condition of hidden identity, when
combined with the social norm of risk aversion, produces a constructive
empathy in the minds of all affected parties. This constructive empathy
does not affect whether there will be a consensus, but, in certain
situations associated with the perceived norm of fairness, it will affect
the terms of the exchange. In summary, justice as efficiency and justice
as fairness can live in harmony under our modified Rawlsean-Coasean
model.

372. See supra note 69.
373. See supranotes 68, 302.
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